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CONTRACTS WITHOUT COURTS OR CLANS:
HOW BUSINESS NETWORKS GOVERN
EXCHANGE
Sadie Blanchard
Legal scholars have long recognized the close-knit
community as an alternative means of supporting trade when
contract law and trusted courts cannot. But recent research
suggests that another option may be available: heterogeneous
business networks. What is interesting is that these networks
lack features traditionally seen as essential to communitysupported trade. In particular, they lack preexisting social ties
that allow reliable information to spread at low cost, make
exiting the trade difficult, and enable the coordinated
sanctioning of cheaters. As a result, some leading scholars have
come to doubt that these networks are capable of sustaining
cooperation.
This Article offers compelling evidence that heterogenous
business networks can indeed sustain high-stakes trade.
Through an original case study of the reinsurance industry, it
shows that when the gains from trade are sufficiently robust,
parties can build mechanisms to spread the reliable
information needed to support trade by starting with
transactions that align incentives and require high
transparency. Parties can then strengthen their commitments
by both investing in the bilateral relationship and building a
network that connects each party to the other’s contacts. This
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strategy helpfully allows information about behavior in trading
relationships to spread at low cost. Once constructed, the
network enables reputation-based bonding of higher-risk
transactions and a greater variety of transactional terms than
can be supported by incentive alignment alone. In short, this
study of the reinsurance trade suggests that cultivated,
freestanding business networks can support extralegal private
ordering under a broader set of circumstances than legal
scholars currently appreciate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have long recognized that when formal
contracting is unavailable to a group of traders, the clan or closeknit community is an alternative institution that can support trade
through reputational governance. The classic example in the legal
literature—described in the most-cited contract law article of the
last quarter century—is the community of Orthodox Jewish
diamond merchants in New York.1
The features of close-knit communities that enable reputationbacked trade, though, are widely viewed as existing only within a
narrow set of circumstances.2 The close-knit community or clan is
able to support risky cooperation, the theory goes, for two reasons:
its members have multidimensional relationships that transcend
commercial matters and exiting the community is prohibitively
costly.3 Reputation works in these communities, it is thought,
because they are densely connected, closed networks.4 Members
trust one another because word of misbehavior will assuredly
spread widely, leaving wrongdoers with nowhere to hide and
nowhere to go.
Contrast the close-knit community with business networks that
are geographically dispersed and heterogenous—networks in which
people may come and go with relative ease, and connections are
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]; see also
Ted Sichelman, Top 25 Most Cited Contract Law Articles Published in the Last 25 Years, NEW
PRIV. L. (Sept. 10, 2015), https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/09/10/top-25-most-citedcontract-law-articles-published-in-the-last-25-years-ted-sichelman/
(listing
Bernstein’s
article as the most cited contract law article published in the last twenty-five years).
2 Some leading scholars have recently challenged this prevailing assumption. See Lisa
Bernstein, Contract Governance in Small-World Networks: The Case of the Maghribi Traders,
113 NW. U. L. REV. 1009, 1014–15 (2019) [hereinafter Bernstein, Contract Governance]
(“[T]he legal literature on private ordering should move beyond its focus on small,
geographically concentrated, close-knit groups . . . and begin to explore the wide variety of
network structures . . . that can be used to support exchange.”); Lisa Bernstein, Alan
Morrison & J. Mark Ramseyer, Private Orderings, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 247, 250 (2015)
(“[T]he social forces and institutions that make private ordering effective can and do operate
in contexts that are not characterized by the conditions that the legal literature commonly
associates with their success such as small, geographically concentrated, socially or ethnically
homogenous groups.”).
3 See infra Section II.B.
4 See infra Section II.B.
1
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fewer and weaker. Traders can do business outside the network.
Word of misbehavior might fail to reach all potential trading
partners. More fundamentally, since ties are weak, it might be hard
for others to tell who is really at fault when a deal goes badly. Each
of these factors would seem to make reputation less effective. As a
result, some leading scholars are skeptical of recent research
suggesting that geographically dispersed and heterogeneous
business networks might support robust, reputation-based
governance of complex obligations.5 Can such business networks
sustain high-stakes cooperation on matters that courts cannot
reach? If so, how?
This Article shows that loose-knit business networks can indeed
sustain complex, high-stakes cooperation and explains how they can
do so. It provides an original case study of a sophisticated, highstakes trading network that was built for commercial activity. The
business network examined here is the reinsurance industry from
its inception in the late nineteenth century until around 1980. The
experience of reinsurance—insurance for insurance companies6—
shows that the challenges to network-based reputational
governance among a loosely connected group facing noisy signals
can be overcome when the expected gains from trade are large
enough and stable enough and commitments cannot be backed costeffectively by law and courts.7
Details about the reinsurance trade—which sustained the global
insurance industry for over 100 years—were gathered from
published writings by, and original interviews with, people who
worked in the industry as well as from recent scholarly work by
historians and sociologists.8 What surfaces is that groups without
preexisting ties can initiate and sustain reputation-backed trade by
aligning incentives, committing to transparency, making targeted
investments in bilateral relationships, and—by bootstrapping from
5 See infra Section II.B and sources cited therein; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel
& Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm
Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 478 n.123 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson et al.,
Contracting for Innovation] (expressing skepticism that reputational governance might work
in the biotech industry). Because of those challenges, legal scholars have explained observed
extralegal contracting as resting on either partial buttressing by courts or on long-term
relational contracting between two parties. See infra Section II.C.
6 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
7 See infra Section IV.C.
8 The Author’s interview methodology is described in the Appendix.
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those mechanisms—building a network that allows useful
information about traders’ behavior to spread. In short, when the
gains from trade are sufficiently large and legal institutions cannot
support exchange, intentionally cultivated business networks can.
The risk spreading that was essential for reinsurance to work
required traders to transact with a large number of others at great
distances, including on different continents. The trade was
established during a time when the legal and communications
infrastructures available for long-distance trade were rudimentary.
Courts were in practice unsuitable for dispute resolution because of
the need for confidentiality and adjudicators with a deep
understanding of the trade.9 Therefore, reinsurance agreements
were for most of their history governed extralegally.10 Parties
eschewed courts and directed industry arbitrators not to interpret
contracts literally but instead to view the parties’ relationships as
“honorable engagements” or “gentlemen’s agreements.”11 This is
remarkable in light of the high stakes, uncertainty, and complexity
involved. It is also instructive.
In lieu of law and courts, reinsurance traders designed deals that
enabled initial cooperation with minimal trust. They did so by
ensuring that both sides would lose or gain together and by being
transparent about their conduct relevant to the other party’s gains
from the deal. Traders strengthened trust and information channels
by making targeted investments in personal relationships that
allowed them to learn a great deal about the capabilities and
trustworthiness of selected counterparties and, indirectly, about
other traders connected to those counterparties. Starting with these
tactics, they built a global business network that functioned as an
additional mechanism for sustaining extralegal trade. The network
provided a number of benefits: riskier but higher-value trade, trade
with more counterparties, and a greater variety of deal structures
than would have been possible by relying only on bilateral
relationships and incentive alignment.12 Understanding how
reinsurance traders built and employed their network to create new
opportunities for cooperation is instructive for economic cooperation
today. Complex collaborations among firms to create new products
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Parts III, IV.
11 See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part V.
9
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are an important and growing source of innovation and productivity
in the global economy.13 Core duties in these collaborations are not
susceptible to formal, judicially backed contracting, and the
collaborations have a high failure rate.14 By building and leveraging
business networks, parties can increase the value they are able to
create through such collaborations.
There is also a theoretical payoff. Recognizing the ability of
groups of traders to build networks for reputational governance
from the ground up suggests, for contract theorists, a new way of
understanding how economic actors might bond commitments, and,
for transactional lawyers, a framework for better understanding
and creating value for clients. Extralegal trade backed by
cultivated, freestanding business networks might arise any time
judicial enforcement of obligations is costly. Court enforcement
might be costly because of limited judicial competence in the subject
of trade; limited judicial enforcement power, such as from
geographic dispersion or systematically under compensatory
damages; or parties’ interest in confidentially. That is to say,
reputation in cultivated networks holds the potential to enable
value-creating collaboration across a broad range of economic
activity. A network will be built only when the cost of building it is
no greater than the value of gains from trade, the cost of statebacked enforcement, or the cost of other bonding mechanisms such
as technologically enabled reputation verification. Network-based
governance might also require a minimum level of market stability
so that players are not excessively concerned about other traders
entering an end-game state that undermines the expected value of
future trade. While those conditions might no longer apply to
reinsurance,15 they are present and will continue to be present

13 See Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV.
281, 285, 298 (2016) [hereinafter Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks]
(discussing the dynamics of complex collaborative networks among firms to create new
technology); Kyle J. Mayer & Nicholas S. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the
Personal Computer Industry, 15 ORG. SCI. 394, 395, 405 (2004) (analyzing interfirm
collaborative relationships and how firms learn to contract).
14 See Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, supra note 13, at 288, 295–96
(outlining informal governance mechanisms in networks and explaining that “[a] number of
studies have found that a majority of alliances [i.e. networks] fail”).
15 See infra Part VI.
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across the economy, including in cutting-edge technological
production.16
Part II explains how the reinsurance industry differs from groups
of traders described in the literature on extralegal private ordering
and outlines this study’s two key contributions to that literature.17
First, this Article offers new evidence, from an original case study,
that supports the theory that looser-knit groups can support
complex trade. Second, it shows that the ties required to sustain
reputational governance within such a group do not require
preexisting noncommercial social ties such as those arising from a
shared distinctive subculture or close family relationships. Rather,
this study reveals how a group of traders can overcome the hurdles
to initial cooperation that are present when reputational
information channels are absent and can purpose-build an
information-spreading network for commercial purposes.
Part III introduces the peculiar historical world of reinsurance,
in which hundreds of millions of dollars were pledged, contingent on
conditions left intentionally vague, in agreements that were not
credibly legally enforceable, to counterparties scattered across
oceans. It tells the story of the rampant moral hazard that nearly
destroyed reinsurance during its early years, the consequent
development of a global reinsurance network that sustained the
insurance industry worldwide, and the possible decline of that
network in the late twentieth century. This Part explains the
extralegal forms reinsurance traders used in their transactions—
including highly incomplete contracts, vague norms, purely
extralegal obligations, and equitable dispute resolution—and why
they used them.
Part IV shows how reinsurance traders initiated cooperation
without legal backing and proceeded to construct a global network
that sustained the global insurance industry. It identifies and
theorizes the deal structures, the business relationships, and the
purpose-built commercial network that sustained informal
exchange without recourse to courts.
Part V discusses the possible decline of network-based
governance in reinsurance and what it suggests about the future of
network-based private ordering. It discusses possible causes and
16
17

See infra Section II.C and sources cited therein.
See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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argues that even if network governance is no longer dominant in
reinsurance, the case of reinsurance has continuing relevance for
other economic sectors because the conditions that gave rise to
network governance in reinsurance are present throughout the
modern-day global economy.
Part VI concludes by outlining the general lessons to be drawn
from the reinsurance case. The experience of reinsurance highlights
the limits of generalist courts’ capability to engage in contextualist
adjudication—such as that envisioned in the Uniform Commercial
Code—to support complex, high-stakes economic activity. Contract
theorists should look for similar network-building as a contractual
governance structure across fields of economic activity. Reinsurance
also holds lessons for lawyers seeking to design deals that reduce
the likelihood and the costs of disputes and contract failure for their
clients.

II. CONTRACTING WITHOUT COURTS OR CLANS: TRADE IN A
FREESTANDING BUSINESS NETWORK
The scholarship on methods for bonding contractual
commitments has focused on three mechanisms: long-term bilateral
relationships, courts and other formal enforcement mechanisms,
and multilateral reputation.
Bilateral sanctions will in some cases be adequate to prevent
suboptimal performance. If two parties expect to deal with one
another again, the prospect of future dealings might deter cheating
or shirking in the present round of exchange.18 The discipline of
long-term bilateral relationships, however, is limited by the
prospect that the relationship will end, which in turn depends on
the extent of relationship-specific investment and the availability of
alternative counterparties.19 If either party can exit the relationship
18 See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual
Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 449 (1996) (modeling the threat of relationship
termination as an extralegal enforcement mechanism); David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John
Roberts & Robert Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,
27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 247–48 (1982) (modeling how knowledge that the relationship will
continue for a specified number of future rounds might affect decision whether to maximize
immediate payoff).
19 See Emily Kadens, Cheating Pays, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (2019) (explaining that
if a party does not have meaningful alternative partners, she cannot refuse to deal with a
cheating counterparty, or refusing to deal with a cheater is not worth the cost of switching to
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at low cost, because it has not made substantial relationship-specific
investment and other counterparties are available, then bilateral
cooperation is susceptible to failure.20
Therefore, exchange that depends heavily on extralegal private
ordering tends to involve not only the threat of loss of one
relationship, but also the credible threat of the loss of future trade
with others because knowledge of the breach will spread.21
Alternatively, private ordering operates over a range of the
transacting relationship but is backstopped by formal, legal
contract, including the availability of recourse to courts in certain
circumstances. Empirical descriptions by legal scholars and
economists of informal contracting can be grouped into two ideal
types: court-backed trade and clan-based trade. Some cases rely on
both courts and clans, each for different aspects or phases of trading
relationships.
A. COURTS

Parties often plan to rely on legal forms and institutions—
written contracts and courts—for the end-game of their
relationship, that is, in the event that governance by bilateral or
multilateral reputation or norms of reciprocity break down.22 Some
groups of traders create private legal systems that operate like
courts in that traders commit in advance to delegate authority to a
third-party adjudicator to decide disputes according to formal
norms and processes.23 Even when the industry arbitration systems
a new partner unless cheating reaches a threshold); Joel Sobel, For Better or Forever: Formal
Versus Informal Enforcement, 24 J. LAB. ECON. 271, 272 (2006) (demonstrating that the power
of bilateral private sanctions increases with the cost of starting a new relationship); Klein,
supra note 18, at 449 (describing the self-enforcing range of contractual relationships as a
function of the parties’ transaction-specific investments); Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal
Exchange: A Freestanding System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830, 831 (1996) (demonstrating that
the availability of thicker markets undermines bilateral enforcement).
20 See Kranton, supra note 19, at 831 (finding that an availability of alternative sources of
goods impacts enforceability of, and gains from, relational trading).
21 See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
22 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOCIO. REV. 55, 62 (1963) (describing companies that planned their contracts carefully
and exhaustively yet ignored their contracts in day-to-day interactions, relying instead on
mutual accommodation and negotiation).
23 See generally Gillian Hadfield & Barry Weingast, Law Without the State: Legal Attributes
and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment, 1 J.L. & CTS. 3 (2013) (modeling
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lack courts’ ability to coercively enforce arbitration awards, they
have power that similarly functions to deter noncompliance.24
Noncompliance can be reported in industry newsletters, and traders
can be expelled from trade associations and exchanges.25 Trade
associations articulate published rules and maintain arbitration
systems.26 Arbitrators’ opinions are published or communicated by
word of mouth.27 On the spectrum of extralegal ordering modes
ranging from informal to formal,28 these private legal systems are
more court-like in their formality.

the role of decentralized enforcement mechanisms in trade systems); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1731–36 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law] (discussing the cotton industry’s private legal system); Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769–70, 1775–79, 1781–82 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Merchant Law] (comparing private legal systems created by merchant practices to the system
created by the Uniform Commercial Code).
24 See Hadfield & Weingast, supra note 23, at 9 (indicating that in the absence of a thirdparty institution like a court, deterrence of noncompliance must be achieved through
decentralized collective punishment).
25 Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 23, at 1772; see also Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law, supra note 23, at 1737–38 (“Expulsions [from the Exchange] are widely publicized.”);
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 1, at 120 (“The agreement to arbitrate is binding. Unless
the club opts not to hear the case, the member may not seek redress of his grievances in court.
If he does so, he will be fined or expelled from the club. Furthermore, since the agreement to
arbitrate is binding, the court will not hear the case.”). Present-day industry arbitration
systems often rely on state enforcement. But because of confidentiality requirements and
other barriers, judicial enforcement of arbitration awards is sometimes unavailable in
practice. Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 1, at 124, 129–30.
26 See, e.g., Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 1, at 124 (describing the arbitration system
maintained by the Diamond Dealers’ Club); Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 23, at 1772
(referring to the rules established by the National Grain and Feed Association).
27 See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 23, at 1729–30 (“[Board of Appeals]
opinions are circulated to all [American Cotton Shippers Association] and [American Textile
Manufacturers Institute] members.”); Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 23, at 1818, 1820
n.167 (noting that the National Grain and Feed Association “circulates arbitration opinions
to all its members”).
28 See BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE DIAMOND NETWORK & THE
PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE 10–13 (2017) (presenting extralegal dispute
resolution mechanisms ranging from private to public and from formal to informal and
including mechanisms such as arbitration and the “Spontaneous Reputation Mechanism”).
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B. CLANS OR CLOSE-KNIT COMMUNITIES

Clan-based trade is a more informal type of extralegal ordering.
“Clan” is used here as a shorthand for the conventional model of a
close-knit community. The clan typically bonds commitments when
reliable courts are not available or because courts cannot process
the kind of information required to assess the transacting parties’
behavior.29 Clan-like trading networks provide value especially
when the trade requires qualitative information about not only
behaviors but also the context that helps to explain the reasons for
behaviors.30
The close-knit community or clan is able to support cooperation,
according to clan theory, because its members have
multidimensional relationships that transcend commercial matters
and because exit is prohibitively costly.31 A body of scholarly case
studies describes how social interdependence among tight-knit
ethnic and religious groups and in small, geographically
concentrated communities allows those communities to operate as
trading networks that support robust trade with either minimal or
no reliance on conventional contract law institutions.32 Group
homogeneity and the intermingling of commercial and personal

29 See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2425 (2000) (describing the advantages in such situations that
community solutions have over courts).
30 See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,
12 RSCH ORG. BEHAV. 295, 304 (1990) (stating that such networks “are particularly apt for
circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information” and that networks
are “especially useful for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured”).
31 See RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST & TRUSTWORTHINESS 21–23 (2002) (describing communal
incentives which motivate actors in “thick communities” and discussing reasons for actions
which are “less rational”).
32 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff & Peter Temin, Beyond Markets and
Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 404,
417 (2003) (describing how commercial actors in early U.S. history were connected on multiple
social and economic dimensions); McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 29, at 2426 (describing
how monopolists can rely on bilateral sanctions while other traders rely on multilateral
reputational sanctions); Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The “Back Forty” on a Handshake:
Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
366, 368–70 (1992) (observing that farmers and landowners have reason to desire repeatdealing and also that farming communities are small and close-knit and farmers and
landowners are generally immobile, thereby producing effective multilateral reputational
governance).
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social roles have been understood as important to enabling networksupported cooperation absent formal contract.33 There are several
theories of the mechanism by which such clans are able to support
trade without state-provided law. All accounts require that the
group provide channels for information about traders’ behavior to
spread at low costs.34 Some accounts add a tacit agreement among
group members to boycott anyone who cheats another member.35 A
third theory emphasizes the role of shared norms of behavior, which
coordinate expectations and reduce the likelihood of mistaken
interpretations of counterparties’ actions.36 Some leading accounts
emphasize the presence of a communal ethos within the community

33 See Powell, supra note 30, at 300, 302, 326 (noting how homogeneity leads to cooperation
and that “[t]he more homogenous the group, the greater the trust, hence the easier it is to
sustain network-like arrangements” and that “[w]hen the diversity of participants increases,
trust recedes, and so does the willingness to enter into long term collaborations”). The case
studies exemplifying network-based exchange in Powell’s paper reveal a high incidence of
geographically concentrated production. See id. at 309–10 (detailing the pervasiveness of
industrial districts and concentrated “zones” in some industries). The case that long seemed
exceptional to clan theory, that of trade in medieval Europe, has recently been shown to have
been largely facilitated by government regulation of quality or composed of spot transactions,
which do not require the trust needed for sequential performances. See Emily Kadens, The
Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1201 (2012) (detailing how
merchants dealt in markets and the mechanisms which governed the transactions of such
merchants).
34 See JANET TAI LANDA, ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF CHINESE MERCHANTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
IDENTITY, ETHNIC COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 80–81 (2016) (describing the pervasiveness of
low-cost information networks in trade networks); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 1, at
133, 140 (discussing “reputation bonds” and the role they play in small and large-scale
markets); Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912, 916
(1994) [hereinafter Greif, Cultural Beliefs] (“[R]epeated interactions and the resulting social
networks for information transmission facilitate informal collective economic and social
punishments for deviant behavior.”).
35 See Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi
Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 868 (1989) [hereinafter Greif, Reputations and Coalitions]
(“[A]ll coalition merchants agree never to employ an agent who cheated while operating for a
coalition member.”); Greif, Cultural Beliefs, supra note 34, at 922–24 (describing the “value
of mutual responsibility” and the “use of collective punishment,” which could harm the
reputation of individuals who violated community norms); HARDIN, supra note 31, at 184
(noting the manner in which small communities may shun members of the community who
violate norms in a manner that is so severe “as to make continued life in [the] community
difficult or untenable”).
36 See LANDA, supra note 34, at 47–48 (discussing shared Confucian norms in traditional
China and their effect on trade).
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of traders.37 Some even argue that the requisite conditions for clanbacked trade exist only in collectivist cultures.38
Even apart from theories viewing collectivist norms as a
precondition for extralegal trade, clans have been understood as
being distinctive in providing conditions that facilitate the reliable
information dissemination required to support informal exchange.39
37 For example, Landa argues that guanxi—the Confucian norms of implicit mutual
obligations and reciprocity among kin and clan, and the resulting Chinese social institution
of mutual aid known as pang—was crucial to the informal trade-supporting institutions of
the networks of Hokkein Chinese middlemen who traded rubber in Malaysia. See id. at 45–
49 (providing a history of how Chinese immigrants adapted traditional Confucian values to
create mutual aid communities). Duties of loyalty and solidarity were key. Id. They were
strongest among nuclear family members. Id. Among Chinese emigrants living far from their
kin networks, these duties of loyalty and solidarity were transferred to others who came from
the same village or region. Id. at 13, 45–49. Emigrants from the same village or region
grouped together for mutual aid because of a common bond. Id.
38 Greif argues that collectivist culture is necessary to support clan-backed trade. Greif,
Cultural Beliefs, supra note 34, at 913. He defines a collectivist culture as one in which
trading takes place primarily among “members of a specific religious, ethnic, or familial group
[and] in which contract enforcement is achieved through ‘informal’ economic and social
institutions, and members of collectivist societies feel involved in the lives of other members
of their group.” Id.; see also Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions
in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 526 (1993)
[hereinafter Greif, Contract Enforceability] (hypothesizing that the informal and implicit ties
between Maghribi traders enabled their coalition); Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra
note 35, 867–68 (exploring the incentives driving agency relations in the Maghribi coalition).
In Greif’s classic studies, Maghribi Jewish traders in the Muslim world exemplify collectivist
culture, and individualist, European culture cannot support robust informal exchange. Greif,
Cultural Beliefs, supra note 34, at 917, 920–21.
39 The Maghribi traders maintained religious, communal, and familial ties that facilitated
relatively low-cost transmission of information. See Greif, Cultural Beliefs, supra note 34, at
922–23 (noting how the Maghribi traders were non-Muslims who adopted the values of
Muslim society and that these “associated collectivist culture beliefs . . . encouraged retaining
an affiliation with this information network”). In her account of the Maghribi traders,
Bernstein emphasizes the way that the network structure of ties among traders reduced
information costs. See Bernstein, Contract Governance, supra note 2, at 1019–24 (showing
how cultural ties helped ease the flow of information trading). Similarly, Hokkein middlemen
in Malaysia cited the relative ease of learning of other Hokkein merchants’ reputations as a
key reason they preferred to trade with them. See LANDA, supra note 34, at 50 (describing
“business entrepreneurship and community leadership” among Chinese emigrants in Asia as
“inextricably intertwined”). Likewise, diamond merchants were able to post credible
reputation bonds at low cost because they were members of a homogeneous, geographically
concentrated group. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 1, at 116, 133 (“Brokers are able
to gather information about individuals' reputations for trustworthiness at a lower effective
cost than individual buyers and sellers because a broker's investment is less transaction
specific.”). As the homogeneous group regime broke down, the market shifted to a
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Such accounts have been read widely as suggesting that noncommercial interpersonal ties such as those arising from family
connections, within ethnic or religious subcultures, or among
inhabitants of a geographic area in a world of low mobility are
critical to sustaining the low-cost, reliable information channels
that supported extralegal trade.40
But, in reality, clans are only a special case of a general
phenomenon. When courts are unavailable or unsuitable to the
desired exchange and the potential gains from privately ordered
trades are sufficiently large, groups of transactors can devise
alternatives to bond commitments, including by creating networks
that serve the information dissemination function of clans.41 The
next Sections introduce the freestanding business network. This
type of network, with its absence of preexisting noncommercial
social ties, illustrates that the information channels necessary to
support complex trade can be constructed outside the clan or closeknit community model.42
C.

COMBINING

LEGAL

AND

EXTRALEGAL

OR

FORMAL

AND

INFORMAL ORDERING

Contract theorists have studied how networks of firms engaged
in collaborative projects to innovate govern their contracts through
extralegal private ordering.43 Some scholars have begun to describe
technologically based information intermediary system to enforce reputation bonds. See id.
at 140 (explaining how the diamond industry is in transition from a homogeneous regime to
“one that increasingly relies increasingly on information technology”).
40 See Powell, supra note 30, at 300, 326–27 (finding that many examples “suggest that
certain social contexts encourage cooperation and solidarity, or a sense of generalized
reciprocity”). The case studies exemplifying network-based exchange in Powell’s paper reveal
a high incidence of geographically concentrated production. Id. at 308–11.
41 See discussion infra Sections II.C,–D.
42 See infra Section II.D.
43 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to
Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 986–88, 996–97
(describing how innovation-oriented companies rely on formal contracts to maintain and
clarify their relationships); Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, supra note
13, at 281–82 (discussing collaborative networks among high-technology firms); Lisa
Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 599–610 (2015) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Beyond Relational Contracts] (discussing the importance of informal social capital and ties
between firms within a network); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott,
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contracts supported by business networks.44 But given the difficulty
of ascertaining behavior and ascribing fault, and the apparent lack
of barriers to exiting the network in favor of other opportunities,
skepticism remains about the ability of loose-knit business network
to support robust reputation-based governance of complex trading
relationships.45 Leading explanations of how parties that are not
members of clans or close-knit communities govern noncontractible
exchange point to combining elements of formal contracting with
extralegal private ordering within a bilateral relationship with
repeat play.46
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and
Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1379–81 (2010) [hereinafter Gilson et al., Braiding]
(describing a new blending of formal and informal agreements known as “braiding”); Gilson
et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 5, at 458–59, 502 (describing three examples of
blending formal and informal agreements for innovation and the ultimate need for additional
data).
44 See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 43, at 599–610 (analyzing
business networks in variety of contexts); David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Network
Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 242, 243 (2006)
(studying a sample population of “3800 alliance transactions between pharmaceutical firms
and biotechnology research firms”).
45 See Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 5, at 479 n.123 (“While we
recognize the role of reputation as one element of switching costs, we remain skeptical about
the extent to which reputation can carry the weight Robinson and Stuart assign to it. Most
important, it is extremely difficult for third parties, however well-connected, to observe the
conduct of the parties. Suppose a venture fails. Given the very low likelihood of finding a
successful drug, the most reasonable inference is that the outcome is the result of bad luck,
not poor skills or bad faith. From this perspective, reputation is hard to gain, but it is also
hard to lose. Both require repetitive results to separate the signal from the noise.”); Matthew
C. Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 173,
178 (2010) (noting that firms engage in collaborative partnerships to innovate in
transnational, “heterogeneous markets” in which “the preconditions for informal governance
obtain only with difficulty”). The firms studied by Jennejohn are not, however, engaged in
solely extralegal exchange. They use international commercial arbitration, which today is the
most reliably judicially enforceable method of cross-border dispute resolution owing to the
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
See id. (finding contracts between collaborators use arbitration at a higher rate than other
contracts); see also Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 84 Stat. 692, 330 U.N.T.S 3. Unless there are barriers to pursuing
judicial enforcement of international arbitration awards or the form of arbitration used is
atypical as in reinsurance, see infra Section III.B.4., in the post-New York Convention age,
exchange that provides for international arbitration falls squarely in the category of formal,
court-backed contracting.
46 Gilson, Sabel, and Scott have made important contributions to understanding how
parties might combine formal and informal modes of transacting within a bilateral
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Parties might use tightly circumscribed, judicially enforceable
obligations to create opportunities to cultivate trust. That
grounding could enable the parties to bootstrap a contracting
relationship that involves greater commitments that are not
judicially enforceable.47 This is a variety of court-backed relational
contracting, because throughout the relationship, judicial
enforcement is available to protect the parties from the costliest
forms of moral hazard.
Alternatively, even parties having common knowledge that
neither party wields a credible threat of suing might rely on highly
specified contracts and legal advice to structure and manage their
relationship, but also rely on reputation in a small group of loosely
affiliated traders to bond their obligations.48 Formal legal rules
might coordinate expectations about what behaviors constitute
performance and breach when insufficient customary norms exist to
classify behavior because of the high uncertainty surrounding an
innovative endeavor.49
relationship. See generally Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 43 (concluding, in part, that
formal governance complements rather than eliminates informal mechanisms of contract
enforcement); Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 5, at 475 (positing bilateral
“co-design” relationships necessarily rely on informal arrangements beyond their express
contractual terms). Jennejohn similarly answers the question of “how can private ordering
occur in heterogeneous, dispersed networks” by focusing on mechanisms the parties develop
to govern their bilateral relationships. See generally Jennejohn, The Private Order of
Innovation Networks, supra note 13 (introducing the idea of multivalent contracting to
explain governance mechanisms). The account given here does not deny that Gilson, Sabel,
and Scott’s theories might account for how parties support exchange in some cases; rather, it
shows that another option—the cultivated network—is available, even outside the context of
the close-knit community, when courts are unavailable or unsuitable for buttressing
extralegal cooperation.
47 See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 43, at 1401 (arguing that low-powered sanctions
do not crowd out informal mechanisms, while the threat of large damages might). These
greater commitments will also be informal in the second sense that they will not be specified
in advance but rather will be developed over the course of the parties’ collaboration. See id.
at 1403 (explaining that ongoing cooperation between parties allows them to establish greater
commitments over time).
48 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 43, at 987–88, 996–1001 (detailing interview
responses from various businesses indicating those businesses use formal contracts but
informal enforcement mechanisms). As to why they did not view litigation as a serious threat
or avenue of recourse, the parties cited its cost in time and money, the expected insufficiency
of damages and low probability of collecting them, the likelihood a court would decide
incorrectly, and reputational harm. Id. at 998.
49 See id. at 988, 1010–11 (describing the critical “guardrail” or “scaffolding” role formal
contracts can play in innovation-oriented relationships where the meaning of breach can be
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D. FREESTANDING BUSINESS NETWORKS

A few studies by legal scholars have described informal contracts
buttressed by neither courts nor clans but rather by what will here
be called freestanding business networks. The ties among
transactors in freestanding networks differ from the ties among
members of ethnic groups or close-knit, geographically concentrated
communities in that they are largely business or economic ties and
are not embedded in social structures that were preexisting or
primarily served other ends. Robinson and Stuart find this kind of
network structure supporting informal contracting in strategic
alliances between biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical
companies.50 The relevant network arises out of connections from
previous transactions between firms. Bernstein finds a business
network performing the same function among midwestern United
States original equipment manufacturers and their suppliers.51 The
next Part describes another instance of freestanding business
networks: the reinsurance trade. The story of reinsurance begins
with the high counterparty risk faced by reinsurance traders and
their imperative to nevertheless transact across great distances
under conditions that bear little resemblance to the clan or closeknit community as conventionally understood.

III. THE REINSURANCE TRADE
Reinsurance transactions during the period studied were quite
informal, resembling in key respects the informality of clan-based
trade described in the private ordering literature.52 Substantial
ambiguous).
50 See Robinson & Stuart, supra note 44, at 243 (“[B]etter networked firms rely less on
explicit control mechanisms such as equity ownership and more on implicit, network-based
control, all else equal.”).
51 See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 43, at 562 (“Large mid-western
original equipment manufacturers (OEMS) have devised contractual structures to govern
their relationships with suppliers that, while nominally contractual in the traditional sense,
are better understood as private order institutions.”).
52 Trade can be modeled as varying in formality along two dimensions: (1) how completely
parties specify their obligations, and (2) the extent to which they delegate authority to an
adjudicator to enforce their agreements. See Macaulay, supra note 22, at 56 (1963) (explaining
that contracts involve both “rational planning of the transaction and the “existence or use of
actual or potential legal sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate
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ambiguity surrounded the scope of obligations, and the highly
equitable form of arbitration to which parties committed ex ante
(but rarely used) bears little resemblance to conventional notions of
formalistic, textualist adjudication of commercial disputes.53
Additionally, reinsurance traders did not establish formal private
legal systems like those described in the private ordering
literature.54 Yet, though it employed clan-like trading practices, the
reinsurance industry was not ethnically homogeneous and far from

for non-performance”). Exchange involving both low specification of obligations and little
reliance on a third-party adjudicator is clan-like. Clan-like trade includes Hokkein Chinese
middlemen, Maghribi traders, and the Mafia. See generally LANDA, supra note 34 (explaining
the clan-like trade structure of the Hokkien Chinese middlemen); Bernstein, Contract
Governance, supra note 2 (explaining the clan-like trade structure of the Maghribi traders);
Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 38 (explaining further the structure of the Maghribi
traders); Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (explaining the clanlike trade structure of the Italian Mafia). Legal or quasi-legal ordering might combine low
specification with state-backed enforcement or high specification, including the use of formal
legal categories to coordinate expectations, without state-backed enforcement. See, e.g.,
Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 43, at 986–88, 996–97 (describing the latter type of
transaction). While a classic view would categorize the former as private ordering in the
shadow of the law and the latter order without law, see BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS
COMMERCE: THE DIAMOND NETWORK AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE 3–10
(2017), that view focuses primarily on the means of enforcement to determine whether
ordering is legal or extralegal. But the account of Hadfield and Bozovic suggests that law can
play an important role in private ordering apart from allowing coercive enforcement. They
demonstrate the role legal rules can play in coordinating expectations about acceptable and
unacceptable conduct, even when legal enforcement is unavailable. See, e.g., Hadfield &
Bozovic, supra note 43, at 997 (“[Contracts] are frequently consulted by . . . businesses to
understand their own [legal] obligations and those of their partners. They are expressly
brought out to help settle disputes that arise during the course of the relationship.”).
53 As compared to the manufacturing industry transactions that Macaulay studied,
reinsurance agreements are more extralegal, both in form—they are less specified and
provide for the peculiar form of arbitration described here—and because the secrecy interest
made resort to courts unlikely. This is surprising because reinsurance agreements are of a
type that Macaulay expects to give rise to more formal contract. See Macaulay, supra note 22,
at 66–67 (outlining the situations in which formalized contracting will more likely occur).
Unlike Macaulay’s manufacturing production agreements, which left little room for
disagreement about what was agreed, ample space for disagreement remained in reinsurance
agreements. See id. at 63–65 (explaining that in manufacturing production agreements, “we
are not dealing with questions of taste or judgment where people can differ in good faith”).
54 As explained further in Part III below, information about traders’ behavior was spread
informally by word of mouth. Arbitrations were confidential, and there was no formal
mechanism for reporting, excluding, or otherwise penalizing a party that failed to pay an
arbitration award.
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being a close-knit community as conventionally understood; rather,
the network was transnational and commercial from its inception.55
Reinsurance is insurance of insurance policies. It is a contractual
arrangement between a reinsurer and a professional insurer, also
referred to as the ceding company, cedent, or primary insurer.56 In
exchange for premium payments, the reinsurer promises to
reimburse the cedent—subject to specified conditions—for all or,
more commonly, part of losses the insurer pays under a single
insurance policy or a category of policies.57 This study focuses on
treaty reinsurance, which is reinsurance of a defined set of policies,
including policies not yet written.58 A treaty obliges a primary
insurer to cede, and a reinsurer to accept, coverage of either a
percentage of, or the excess over, a threshold amount of each loss
covered by the cedent within a specified category.59 The category
may be defined by hazard, location, other descriptors, or some
55 See infra Section III.A. Sociologists recognize that the importance of geographic
concentration for private ordering depends on the existence of other ties, most notably ethnic,
and on communications and transport technology. See MARK GRANOVETTER, SOCIETY AND
ECONOMY: FRAMEWORKS AND PRINCIPLES 34 (2017) (overviewing the interception of sociology
and economic practices). While improved communication and transportation infrastructure
reduce the barriers to maintaining private order networks, geographic distance has been
found to impede high-stakes cooperation even when communication and transport are
inexpensive. See id. at 31–35 (“[I]ncreasing urbanization . . . weakens the informal control
system . . . and expands the domain of law. [E]nforcement of norms is more effective the more
cohesive or close-knit the network.”); Barry Wellman, The Community Question: The Intimate
Networks of East Yorkers, 84 AM. J. SOCIO. 1201, 1222 (1979) (“Indeed, the car, the telephone,
and the airplane help maintain many kinship ties. Yet space is still a constraint; there are
distances for each tie at which the cost of keeping in contact becomes too great for it to remain
viable.”). Bernstein shows that network-based informal economic exchange can be conducted
over very long distances when there are strong ties between important nodes and those nodes
are part of densely connected networks in each location. See generally Bernstein, Contract
Governance, supra note 2, at 1009 (“The analysis reveals that a particular type of bridge-andcluster configuration of ties among traders and trading centers—known as a ‘small-world
network’—can have strong reputation-based contract enforcement properties that make it
possible support trade over long distances, even in environments of noisy information.”).
56 See EDWIN W. KOPF, NOTES ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF REINSURANCE 23
(1929) (defining reinsurance).
57 See id. (“In the most widely accepted sense, reinsurance is understood to be that practice
where an original insurer, for a definite premium, contracts with another insurer (or insurers)
to carry a part or the whole of a risk assumed by the original insurer.”).
58 See H. ERNEST FEER, APPROACH TO REINSURANCE 26 (1951) [hereinafter FEER,
APPROACH TO REINSURANCE] (outlining the standard language and benefits of treaty
reinsurance policies).
59 See id. (defining obligatory treaties).
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combination of characteristics.60 An example is all fire insurance
policies written on property in Boston for a one-year term.
The alternative to treaty reinsurance is facultative reinsurance,
which is reinsurance of an individual policy, today typically covering
a large risk such as a dangerous voyage, a concert, or a high-value,
high-risk property.61 Treaty reinsurance has historically been far
more prevalent than facultative reinsurance and remains so today,
for reasons that are explained below.62 This study focuses on
reinsurance treaties between dedicated reinsurers—that is, firms
that dealt exclusively or primarily in reinsurance—and primary
insurers, because from the late nineteenth century to the late
twentieth century dedicated reinsurers dominated the market.63
A. INDUSTRY OVERVIEW

1. The First 130 Years. During the industry’s early decades, fraud
and moral hazard were rampant. German novelist Thomas Mann’s
Nobel Prize-winning novel Buddenbrooks, published in 1901, relays
a tale of reinsurance fraud.64 Upon learning of a fire in a town in
which his firm has issued fire insurance policies, a character
immediately reinsures those policies without disclosing the fire to
See id. (detailing categories covered by the cedent).
See KOPF, supra note 56, at 28, 42–43, 86 (explaining the facets of facultative
reinsurance).
62 See id. (explaining the facultative insurance’s history); see also H. ERNEST FEER, THE
SYSTEM OF TREATY REINSURANCE IN FIRE INSURANCE 21 (1926) [hereinafter FEER, TREATY
REINSURANCE IN FIRE INSURANCE] (explaining the difficulties with the price of reinsurance).
63 Companies dedicated exclusively to reinsurance developed largely because primary
insurers did not want to share their customer lists, underwriting information, and other
commercially sensitive information with competitors. See, e.g., SWISS RE, A HISTORY OF
INSURANCE 23 (2017) (describing reinsurance journey to dominance during the nineteenth
century); KENNETH R. THOMPSON & KENNETH RALPH, REINSURANCE; A DIGEST ON SOME
ASPECTS OF THE PRACTICE OF REINSURANCE AND EXCESS INSURANCE AND A LEGAL TREATISE
ON THE SUBJECT 15, 158 (1950) (describing how reinsurance prevented businesses from
having to share their customer lists); KOPF, supra note 56, at 28, 30 (explaining treaty types
and risk); FEER, TREATY REINSURANCE IN FIRE INSURANCE, supra note 62, at 19, 21 (detailing
reinsurance interactions with customer information and underwriting).
64 See generally THOMAS MANN, BUDDENBROOKS (1901) (chronicling the decline of a
German merchant family and their involvement with reinsurance fraud). The Nobel Prize in
Literature is usually conferred for an author’s body of work, but the Academy specified that
it awarded Mann the prize “principally for his great novel, Buddenbrooks.” Thomas Mann
Facts,
NOBEL
PRIZE:
LITERATURE,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1929/mann/facts/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).
60
61
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the reinsurer.65 Mann was an acquaintance of the chairman of Swiss
Re, one of the first and largest reinsurance firms, and had
undoubtedly heard the laments of reinsurance men.66 Several of the
oldest and largest reinsurance firms nearly went bankrupt during
these early decades because of the kind of subterfuge depicted in
Buddenbrooks.67 Insurers were reinsuring most of their risk among
themselves and passing the poorest risks on to dedicated reinsurers
that could not accurately assess the quality of risks in the many farflung places into which they were venturing.68 Nevertheless,
reinsurance firms viewed broad geographic risk spreading as
imperative to their survival and therefore sought to overcome the
transactional perils of doing business in distant markets.69
The producer side of the reinsurance market was concentrated
throughout the relevant period.70 Historically, reinsurance
provision, measured by premium value, has been concentrated in
Germany and Switzerland.71 London became an important market
in the middle of the twentieth century.72 On the other hand,
throughout much of the relevant period, there were many primary
insurance companies and there was more market entry and exit
among primary insurers.73 The network of reinsurance transacting
See HAROLD JAMES, PETER BORSCHEID, DAVID GUERLI & TOBIAS STRAUMANN, THE
VALUE OF RISK: SWISS RE AND THE HISTORY OF REINSURANCE 11 (2013) (“Thomas Mann's
famous novel of bourgeois decline, Buddenbrooks, includes . . . a scene in which Tony
Buddenbrook’s apparently resepectable son-in-law . . . passes on to reinsurers policies after
fires occured.”).
66 See id. at 11, 46, 260, 263 (noting Mann’s knowledge about reinsurance fraud and
relationship with Charles Simon, chairman of Swiss Re’s board of directors).
67 See id. at 11, 251 (explaining the risk of reinsurance fraud described in Buddenbrooks,
and the moral hazard of insurers offloading risks onto reinsurers).
68 See id. at 251–54 (detailing the problems with reinsurance and describing the writings
of the editor of an 1880s insurance journal about the precarious state of the fledgling
reinsurance industry).
69 See id. at 253 (explaining that Swiss Re needed domestic and foreign contracts to absorb
irregular major losses).
70 See KOPF, supra note 56, at 45–46, 48, 51–57, 74 (calculating that there were around 152
reinsurance companies in 1927).
71 See id. at 33 (comparing German to Swiss reinsurance companies).
72 See MANAGING RISK IN REINSURANCE: FROM CITY FIRES TO GLOBAL WARMING app. 301
(Niels Viggo Haueter & Geoffrey Jones, eds., 2017) (accounting for specialist reinsurance
companies by year of foundation and country).
73 See, e.g., Robin Pearson, The Birth Pains of a Global Reinsurer: Swiss Re of Zürich, 1854–
79 (pt. 1), 8 FIN. HIST. REV. 27, 41–44 (2001) [hereinafter Pearson, Birth Pains] (detailing
Swiss Re’s and the reinsurance market’s problems, including primary insurers moving “more
65
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parties was, therefore, large, heterogeneous, and geographically
dispersed.
The first dedicated reinsurance firms were created in Germany,
Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland in the 1850s and 1860s.74 By
1873, there were twenty-five dedicated reinsurance firms on the
European continent;75 by 1900, around thirty-seven dedicated
reinsurance firms existed across Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
Switzerland; and by 1925, over 150 firms existed worldwide, most
of them in Scandinavia and the United States.76
Since this early growth, the structure of the reinsurance side of
the industry has been remarkably stable.77 A few German and Swiss
reinsurance firms have held a plurality or majority of global market
share for the industry’s entire history, save temporary wartime
disruptions to the German firms.78 The two largest reinsurance
firms at the end of the nineteenth century, Munich Re and Swiss
Re, retained their market positions at the beginning of the twentyfirst century.79
While London, and especially Lloyd’s of London, is famous for its
historical role in the development of insurance, London firms were
not major players in reinsurance until after World War I, and they
never—during the period studied—played as large a role in this
sector of the insurance market as the German and Swiss
reinsurance firms.80 London increased its market share from near
deeply into reinsurance markets”).
74 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 252 (discussing the origins of reinsurance firms).
75 See id. (comparing the quantity of reinsurance firms in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
Switzerland prior to 1870 and after 1873).
76 See id. at 154 (detailing different countries’ reinsurance company growth).
77 See Niels Viggo Haueter & Geoffrey Jones, Risk and Reinsurance, in MANAGING RISK IN
REINSURANCE: FROM CITY FIRES TO GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 72, at 1, 12 (noting the lack
of changing reinsurance powers in the industry).
78 See id. at 12–13, 16 (explaining how Swiss and German reinsurance came to dominate
the industry).
79 See PAULA JARZABKOWSKI, REBECCA BEDNAREK & PAUL SEE, MAKING A MARKET FOR
ACTS OF GOD: THE PRACTICE OF RISK TRADING IN THE GLOBAL REINSURANCE INDUSTRY 12
(2015) (describing Munich Re and Swiss Re’s power, and that together the companies held
thirty-three percent of premiums ceded in 2012).
80 See Robin Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure, in MANAGING RISK IN
REINSURANCE: FROM CITY FIRES TO GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 72, at 70, 77 [hereinafter
Pearson, Industry Structure] (discussing why England “failed to develop powerful
professional reinsurance companies to rival those in Zurich and Munich”); see also JAMES ET
AL., supra note 65, at 78 (describing the temporary dominance of London reinsurance firms
and their subsequent decline after World War I); KOPF, supra note 56, at 38–39 (describing
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zero during this time to around six percent in 2012.81 The English
insurance industry had ample capital and sufficiently diverse
opportunities to spread risk through coinsurance, rendering
reinsurance marginal.82
As for the insurance firms with which reinsurance companies did
business, by 1900, there were nearly 1,300 insurance companies in
twenty-six countries.83 There are indications the number might
have fallen over the subsequent decades due to consolidation.84 To
spread risk, the earliest reinsurance firms underwrote risks across
thousands of locations, initially underwriting primarily fire
insurance policies.85 Reinsurance was therefore an early industry to
globalize.86 Munich Re was formed with an explicit goal of engaging
in transnational business; before 1900, it had branch offices in
Paris, Russia, London, and New York.87 After a tumultuous start,
Swiss Re shifted focus to wider geographic spread of risk; a key part
of this strategy was to resist entering into contracts that required it

how “friendly” Lloyd’s underwriters co-wrote large risks); id. at 42 (discussing the late
development of reinsurance in England); id. at 45–75 (compiling statistics on premiums
written and number of companies by country in 1927); R.N.M.M. Pearce, British Re-Insurance
Conditions Reviewed, E. UNDERWRITER, Jan. 27, 1922, at 16 (reporting on a speech made by
C.E. Golding given to British insurers before the Insurance Institute of Bristol exhorting
them to do business with “this new branch” of the British insurance sector, newly created
reinsurers).
81 See JARZABKOWSKI ET AL., supra note 79, at 12 (outlining the emergence of British
reinsurance in the 1880s in comparison to its 6.6% global market share in 2012).
82 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 155, 172 (discussing the diversification of insured
objects over time and the British co-insurance system). By another account, British insurers
ceded a great deal of reinsurance to Continental reinsurance firms during this period. See
NIELS VIGGO HAUETER, A HISTORY OF UK INSURANCE 9, 12 (Swiss Re Corp. Hist. ed., 2017)
(citing the gradual decline in British reinsurance practice due to competitor reinsurance
companies in Continental Europe).
83 See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 155 (providing the number of insurance
companies operating in the national market from 1800 to 1900).
84 See Robin Pearson, Mergers and Concentration in the UK Insurance Industry, 72
ENTERPRISES ET HISTOIRE 7, 14 (2013) (listing examples of insurance company mergers
between 1900 and 1920).
85 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 44–45 (reviewing the impact of the fire insurance
industry on underwriting and the development of reinsurance firms).
86 See KOPF, supra note 56, at 31–32 (discussing the history of one of the first international
reinsurance firms founded in 1880 by Carl von Thieme).
87 See David M. Holland, A Brief History of Reinsurance, 65 REINSURANCE NEWS, Feb. 2009,
at 19 (detailing the founding of Munich Re and its early international business).
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to accept a block of risk tied to particular regions or countries.88 In
the first decade after its 1863 founding, Swiss Re reinsured risks in
20,000 locations, across Europe, North America, and Asia,
transacting with around thirty direct insurers.89 Reinsurers
depended in most cases on the information provided by insurers
about risks to be reinsured in distant locations.90 By 1900, several
Continental reinsurers were selling reinsurance in the United
States through branch offices, subsidiaries, and directly from
abroad.91 Reinsurance’s transnational character and the dominance
of Continental European firms, especially German and Swiss firms,
continued through the late twentieth century, with temporary shifts
away from German reinsurers to reinsurers based in neutral
countries during the two world wars.92
The German firms resumed their prominent positions following
the world wars.93 While wartime trade restrictions drove some
business to firms in Scandinavia and Switzerland and occasioned
the temporary development of greater reinsurance capacity within
the United States until 1929, many business relationships
continued throughout the period.94
88 See Pearson, Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 73 (noting that only twelve percent of
Swiss Re’s income came from Switzerland); see also Pearson, Birth Pains, supra note 73, at
43 (discussing Swiss Re’s risk-spreading strategy).
89 See Pearson, Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 73 (listing the continents where Swiss
Re had agreements with twenty-six partner firms); see also Pearson, Birth Pains, supra note
73, at 43 (explaining that Swiss Re had its business spread across around 20,000 locations);
JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 254 (describing the breadth of Swiss Re’s risk).
90 See, e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 254 (discussing Swiss Re’s reliance on insurers
to understand the risks that it was reinsuring).
91 See id. at 260 (detailing the development of Continental reinsurance company
involvement in the United States); see also KOPF, supra note 56, at 32, 72 (describing the
establishment of German reinsurance business in New York, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts,
as well as generally across the United States).
92 See Holland, supra note 87, at 22–23 (discussing the effect of the World War I on German
reinsurance companies and the movement of business to companies not affected by trade
restrictions).
93 See id. at 24 (noting that the postwar period was profitable for the reinsurance industry
and listing a timeline of twentieth century reinsurance firm developments).
94 See Alexandros-Andreas Kyrtsis, The Rise and Decline of Treaty Reinsurance, in
MANAGING RISK IN REINSURANCE 144, 162 (Niels Viggo Haueter & Geoffrey Jones, eds. 2017)
(explaining the brief period of influential American reinsurance firms before 1929); see also
Holland, supra note 87, at 23 (describing the rise of reinsurance firms in neutral companies
during the Second World War but also noting the continued existence of international
business relations during the wars).
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While reinsurers sometimes took majority or minority ownership
of primary insurers, most transactions were not with related
insurance firms. Reinsurers relied most heavily on vertical
integration during and after World War I.95 They turned to vertical
integration as the war undermined other key mechanisms they used
to support trade: trading networks were severely disrupted by
wartime restrictions and the rise in protectionist policies, travel
restrictions reduced monitoring capacity, and currency and
economic volatility raised the risk of opportunism and moral
hazard.96
During the period of study, the market relied only partially and
episodically on brokers, which did not become a fixture until well
into the twentieth century.97 There are some indications that
brokers were important in the late eighteenth and very early
nineteenth century in certain markets that continental reinsurers
were newly entering.98 There is scant evidence available, however,
to determine how large a role they played during that time, and they
are believed to have declined in importance thereafter.99 The
historical exceptions were members of Lloyd’s of London when they
95 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 70–71, 78 (discussing the effects of World War I on
reinsurance).
96 Forty percent of reinsurance premium income between 1914 and 1938 was from related
insurance firms. Id. at 79–80, 283. Munich Re relied relatively more on vertical integration
than most firms, creating Allianz, a primary insurer that became one of its largest ceding
companies. See id. at 11 (overviewing the business innovations of Munich Re and the creation
of Allianz). Swiss Re did not begin taking equity stakes in primary insurers until the 1920s.
See id. (“The ownership of direct insurance was not initiated by Swiss Re until the 1920s.”).
On the policy and economic climates during and after the two world wars and their impact
on the reinsurance trade, see Kyrtsis, supra note 94, at 145, 159–61, 168–69 (discussing in
detail the shifts in the insurance industry during and after the world wars due to early
twentieth century globalization and the “consecutive waves of economic instability after the
First World War”).
97 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 181–82 (describing the relationship between the
reinsurance industry and brokerages).
98 See Pearson, Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 75 (discussing the ability of
reinsurance brokers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to settle losses
efficiently, set correct treaty limits, and provide clients with equitable risk distributions).
99 See Pearson, The Development of Reinsurance Markets During the Nineteenth Century,
24 J. EUR. ECON. HIST. 557, 558 (1995) (reasoning that because the reinsurance market at
the time was also occupied by non-specializing companies, it is difficult to measure the size,
growth, and profitability of reinsurance companies); Pearson, Industry Structure, supra note
80, at 76 (“Over the following decades . . . reinsurance continued to suffer . . . as all kinds of
non-insurance institutions plunged into the market.”).
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began to participate in the market after 1920.100 Brokers began to
become players to speak of in segments of the United States
reinsurance market after 1950.101 For several decades thereafter,
the market was divided into reinsurance firms that did and those
that did not use brokers.102 The largest firms, the Continental firms,
generally did not use brokers until around 1980.103
2. The Last Fifty Years. Although some observers continue to
characterize reinsurance as “a business built on personal
relationships, goodwill and mutual trust,” others report a decline in
long-term relationships and an increase in conflict between insurers
and reinsurers.104 Reinsurance relationships and transactions today
undoubtedly look different than they did fifty or so years ago. In a
relatively brief period beginning around the 1970s, reinsurance
contracts got much longer. It is now not unusual for contracts to be
between 100 and 200 pages long. This change in contract form might
be expected to be accompanied by other changes in recourse to legal
institutions suggesting a breakdown in trust or informality of
relationship management, such as increased litigation. While
industry commentators observe that litigation is more frequent,105
preliminary statistics suggest that while, at least in the United
States, the incidence of litigation seems to have increased in

100 See JARZABKOWSKI ET AL., supra note 79, at 12 (“The Lloyd’s market is unique in being
fully brokered, meaning that all business in Lloyd’s must be traded via a Lloyd’s accredited
broker.”).
101 Interview (Aug. 15, 2019).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Robin Pearson, Normative Practices, Narrative Fallacies? International Reinsurance
and its History, BUS. HIST. 1, 2 (2020) [hereinafter Pearson, Normative Practices] (citing
several sources and quoting one commentator’s assessment that “the traditional reinsurance
market characterized by personal relationships, emotions and social understanding is dead
and will not return”).
105 See id. at 2 (“In the 1990s legal scholars pointed to the huge rise in litigation, the demise
of arbitration, and the end of the principle of ‘utmost good faith’ in reinsurance contracts.”).
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absolute number of cases, it has not increased relative to the size of
the market.106
Industry participants also report a rise in arbitration.107 The
increase in the number of disputes has led to increased
formalization of reinsurance arbitration.108 Reinsurance arbitrators
are professionalizing, and a trade association they have formed has
codified traditional arbitration procedures into rules, though
adoption of those rules in reinsurance contracts has been slow.109
B. EXTRALEGALITY AND INFORMALITY IN REINSURANCE

Reinsurance transactions were for most of the industry’s
history—from its inception in the mid-nineteenth century to the
second half of the twentieth century—extralegal and informal in
several respects: contracts were highly incomplete; they used a form
of dispute resolution that was unpredictable; and they included
vague norms and implicit obligations of reciprocity.110 Agreements
were typically written for a renewable one-year term, but it was
common for parties to renew, sometimes with amended terms, for
decades.
A preliminary analysis of lawsuits per billion dollars of premiums written is on file with
the Author. A case count was conducted by searching for decisions including the word
“reinsurance” in all United States courts on Lexis Advance and refining the results using the
terms “reinsurer or retrocessionaire or cedent or reinsured” to target cases between primary
insurers and reinsurers. The facts or the overview of each case were then reviewed to make
sure that they were cases between insurers and reinsurers. The value of reinsurance
premiums written was hand-collected from print annual reports of The National Underwriter,
an industry trade publication and from S&P, Global Reinsurance Highlights 72–83 (2018).
107 See, e.g., Michael J. Brady & Lawrence O. Monin, Reinsurance Disputes: Death of the
Handshake, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 529, 529 (1994) (“The number of reinsurance disputes has
grown at an exponential rate, and more and more they are being resolved formally by
litigation or arbitration.”). Most adjudicated reinsurance disputes are heard in arbitration.
See Robert F. Salm, Reinsurance Contract Wording, in REINSURANCE 79, 88 (1980) (“[I]f any
dispute shall arise between the Company and the Reinsurers . . . such dispute, upon written
request of either party, shall be submitted to three arbitrators.”).
108 See Larry Schiffer, Reinsurance Arbitration—A Primer, INT’L RISK MGMT INST.: EXPERT
COMMENT. (Dec. 2021), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/reinsurancearbitration-a-primer (correlating the rise in reinsurance arbitrations and the formalization
of arbitration procedures).
109 See id. (discussing the formalization of reinsurance arbitration).
110 See e.g., Steven W. Thomas, Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance: A Tradition in Need of
Adjustment, 41 Duke L.J. 1548, 1560–61 (1992) (describing the historically informal nature
of reinsurance transactions).
106

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

29

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 [2022], Art. 5

262

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:233

1. Incomplete Contracts. Written agreements were brief, often
perfunctory, sometimes even scribbled on scrap paper.111 Parties
often waited long stretches after entering into an agreement before
preparing a contract with detailed terms. For example, the first
known reinsurance treaty involving an English company was
concluded orally in 1824 with a French company and confirmed by
an exchange of letters. The parties agreed on the class of risk to be
covered, the premium, and the coverage proportion. The contracting
parties each pledged their good faith; they did not prepare a formal
contract document. The agreement was continuously renewed for at
least a century. The minutes of the board meeting at which the
French company approved the agreement capture the trust-based
nature of the relationship: “The Board consider that the agreement
between the two companies is sufficiently established by their
correspondence. Besides, the good faith of the London company does
not permit of the anticipation of any infringement on its part of the
agreement concluded between the two parties.”112 A treaty was
eventually prepared forty years later when one of the two companies
was acquired.113
As late as the 1970s, contracts were concluded by a “slip”
document of a few pages, which often left open terms marked “to be
agreed” or entirely unspecified.114 Companies agreed initially to the
essential terms.115 Those included at minimum the premium to be
111 See Salm, supra note 107, at 79 (“The long and well established tradition that
reinsurance transactions are a matter of ‘utmost good faith’ between the parties has had a
predictable effect on the preparation of reinsurance contracts . . . . The typical reinsurance
contract is a relatively short, concise document, noticeably lacking in the legalisms so
characteristic of other types of contracts. This underlying assumption of utmost good faith
allows the companies to draft a document that assumes both parties are so knowledgeable on
the subject matter to be dealt with and possess such a degree of sophistication as to preclude
the necessity for long, expository declarations of intent and implementation.”).
112 C. E. GOLDING, STERLING OFFS., LTD., A HISTORY OF REINSURANCE, WITH SIDELIGHTS
ON INSURANCE: OFFERED AS A MEMENTO OF FIFTY YEARS’ SERVICE IN THE REINSURANCE
WORLD 47 (1927) (translating La National board minutes from French).
113 See id. at 47–48 (indicating that no written record of this treaty existed prior to 1864,
nearly forty years later); see KOPF, supra note 56, at 38 (stating that this 1824 treaty
remained in force).
114 See Brady & Monin, supra note 107, at 529 (discussing the informal nature of contracts,
even well into the twentieth century).
115 See JOHANNES BÄHR & CHRISTOPHER KOPPER, MUNICH RE: THE COMPANY HISTORY
1880–1980, at 369 (Patricia Casey Sutcliffe trans. 2016) (describing Munich Re’s traditional
assessment and assumption of cedent risk); KOPF, supra note 56, at 38 (demonstrating that
the parties agreed to the initial terms via an exchange of letters).
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paid to the reinsurer and the commission to be allowed to the
cedent;116 the class of risk covered; the percentage of each loss to be
covered (if the treaty was for proportional reinsurance) or the
threshold amount above which any loss would be covered (if excessof-loss reinsurance); liability limits; the inception and end dates;
and the minimum proportion of coverage the cedent must retain on
its own account (known as the retention requirement).117 The
expressly agreed upon terms might also include reference to
exclusions, warranties, or an arbitration agreement. Reference to
these other terms, when present, would often be perfunctory. For
example, the slip might simply say “arbitration clause” without
including the wording of an arbitration agreement.118 Sometimes
additional or more elaborated terms would be set out later; other
times the parties never expressly agreed on a fully specified
contract.119 This practice continued to be widespread enough in the
1990s that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a

116 Premiums are typically expressed as a percentage of the premium of each covered
primary policy, less a “ceding commission” allowed to the cedent to cover its business
acquisition, underwriting, and claims processing expenses. See THOMPSON & RALPH, supra
note 63, at 60 (explaining the calculation of premiums). For instance, the premium might be
forty percent less fifteen percent ceding commission.
117 See id. at 62–67 (discussing the typical contents of a reinsurance agreement).
118 See Cologne Life Reins. Co. v. Zurich Reinsurance Inc., 730 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63–64 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001) (describing a facultative placement slip that refers to arbitration but lacks
language of an arbitration agreement); Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne
Reinsurance Co., 552 N.E.2d 139, 140–41 (N.Y. 1990) (describing the process of concluding a
facultative policy: a telex disclosed the risk and term; legally binding acceptances were
telexed; communications did not include “utmost good faith,” “follow the fortunes,” or policy
exclusions, which were included in the formal coverage certificates issued months later); Am.
Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 216 F.2d 176, 177 (9th Cir. 1954) (describing a
facultative policy in which the binder included warranties). While the trade literature refers
to binders and placement slips as containing only “rudimentary details” or “the essential
economic terms,” I have not found a more detailed description of the of terms typically
included in treaty binders, nor have I found a court decision discussing treaty binder terms.
The cases cited above discuss facultative reinsurance binders and are presented here to
indicate the kinds of terms that might have been included in treaty binders. See also
Interview (Sept. 13, 2019) (“You would try to nail down the main things: scope of coverage,
term, pricing. Sometimes exclusions would be important depending on what you’re covering,
for example, war or terrorism. Retention is very important, has to be nailed down at
beginning, also the commission and if it adjusts, how it adjusts.”).
119 See Salm, supra note 107, at 79 (explaining that tradition dictates that reinsurance
transactions rely on good faith and do not require explicit legal terms)
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body of state regulators, passed a rule requiring reinsurance
contracts to be finalized within nine months of their inception.120
The binder or slip confirming the agreement would not typically
include the utmost good faith or follow the fortunes obligations of
an arbitration agreement.121 Other terms that the parties might
have included to address foreseeable circumstances (but typically
did not include) can be ascertained from old and recent reinsurance
treaties.122 They include the reinsurer’s right to inspect and audit
the cedent’s books, the cedent’s obligation to send the reinsurer
periodic accounts of policies written and losses incurred (called
bordereaux), definitions of what constitutes a loss occurrence, 123
exclusions of certain kinds of risk, termination clauses, and the
cedent’s warranties regarding maintenance of other reinsurance
coverage or the details of the risk to be covered.124
120 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL
62–67 (1999) (“[I]f an agreement entered into, renewed or amended on or after January 1,
1994 has not been finalized . . . within nine months after the commencement of the policy
period covered by the agreement, then the agreement is presumed to be retroactive.”).
121 Interview (Aug. 14, 2019). This interview was with someone who started in the industry
in the 1980s, and this person explained that even at that late year, it was common for years
to go by after a reinsurance treaty was bound before the parties prepared a contract setting
out terms. Id.
122 See Salm, supra note 107, at 79 (explaining that most reinsurance contracts do not
typically outline all terms especially regarding industry accepted terminology).
123 An example is whether a series of storms that hit within the course of a week constitute
one occurrence or several. Recent, more specified contracts set precise limits; for instance,
one occurrence of storm damage will be defined as damage occurring within a seventy-twohour period. As late as 1980, it was typical to leave the meaning of one event intentionally
vague. As the first reinsurance textbook explains:
Such an approach eliminates the need for lengthy discussions of how the
actual occurrence date is to be determined, a determination which may be
impossible to spell out precisely and comprehensively in the contract because
of the variable circumstances of each case. To rely simply on the term “arising
out of one event” assumes that the parties will be able to reach mutual
agreement, according to the customs of the business and depending on the
circumstances applicable to each situation . . . . [T]he compromise approach
is taken: referring to “one event” in the contract, and relying on the good faith
of the parties to agree on an equitable solution.
Id. at 102; see also Agreement Between Casualty Reins. Assoc. & Insurance Co. N. Am. (1951),
Case 2:05-cv-02811-GEKP, Document 1-1, at 5 (Exhibit A), Filed June. 13, 2005 (on file with
author) (defining “accident” as “accident or occurrence, or series of accidents or occurrences
arising out of one event” and not defining “one event”).
124 See Salm, supra note 107, at 80–116 (defining sixteen terms and clauses commonly used
in reinsurance contracts).
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2. Vague Norms. Reinsurance contracts are also characterized by
indeterminate norms that leave significant room for disagreement
between the parties as to what is required of each.125 The two central
governing norms of reinsurance contracts are the duty of utmost
good faith and the obligation of the reinsurer to follow the fortunes
of the insurer.126
What these duties entailed precisely is difficult to ascertain.
They are commonly described as giving rise to obligations of
confidence and trust like those present in a partnership or a similar
fiduciary relationship.127 As the first reinsurance textbook explains,
“The slightest suspicion that either the reinsurer or the client
company is not treating the agreement as an honorable engagement
puts the entire relationship in jeopardy and may very well lead to
cancellation of the contract.”128
The most easily grasped component of the obligation of utmost
good faith is the cedent’s duty to disclose all material information.129
Caveat emptor does not apply.130 The risk of nondisclosure falls
squarely on the cedent’s shoulders, and the reinsurer is entitled to
rely on the information provided by the ceding company.131 The
utmost good faith disclosure requirement implies that “a person’s
See id. at 79 (providing an overview of the norms in the reinsurance contract drafting
process).
126 See Gerard V. Mantese & Mark C. Rossman, Reinsurance Contracts and the Role of
Fiduciary Duty, 86 MICH. BAR J. 18, 19–20 (2007) (describing the duty of utmost good faith
and the follow the fortune provision). Even outside the reinsurance context, utmost good faith
in insurance generally is understood as being a substantially different duty from good faith.
What utmost good faith requires in reinsurance specifically, given the different character of
the parties’ relationship as compared to other insurance contract, is less ascertainable
because there is not a body of published case law to elaborate the principle. See Steven W.
Thomas, Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance: A Tradition in Need of Adjustment, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1548, 1597 (1991) (“[C]haracterizing the reinsurance relationship as one of utmost good
faith is no longer an accurate description . . . [because t]he sparseness of caselaw and
precedent have placed courts in the unenviable position of developing a coherent
jurisprudence.”).
127 See Henry T. Kramer, The Nature of Reinsurance, in REINSURANCE 13 (1980) (“The
quota-share form of reinsurance is frequently indistinguishable from a partnership, but this
is the result of terms and conditions carefully chosen to have that effect.”).
128 Salm, supra note 107, at 100.
129 See Kramer, supra note 127, at 9 (“A basic duty of the reinsured is to disclose to the
reinsurer all known information touching on the risk of loss.”).
130 See id. (“As used in reinsurance, utmost good faith means that the maxim of caveat
emptor has no application to either party in the relationship.”).
131 See id. (discussing the reinsurer’s rights against a non-disclosing cedent).
125
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word is good . . . and it will be relied upon. In giving it, the person
is necessarily assumed to be authorized to do so and to be
sufficiently knowledgeable and skilled to preclude its groundless
disavowal later.”132 Under reinsurance treaties, disclosure
requirements are broad.133 In addition to information about the risk
underwritten, treaty reinsurance requires disclosure of other
reinsurance purchased for the same risks, underwriting and claims
handling practices, and all relevant information about past loss
experience.134
Other aspects of the utmost good faith requirement are more
elusive. Consider the following description:
In its simplest terms, the reinsurer intends to assume
risk for the purpose of making a profit, and the ceding
insurer intends to be indemnified in respect of loss when
it happens. Neither party may mislead or baulk the
other in the legitimate realization of these goals,
notwithstanding the goals are mutually exclusive.135
Despite the breezy dismissal of the incompatibility of the parties’
respective goals of making a profit and being indemnified, this
seems to be the crux of the problem. But another trader described
the relationship similarly:
In my mind there’s a material difference between
partners and counterparties. Counterparty even sounds
like you have different interests. Good faith falls toward
the partnership concept. Reinsurance deals in years
past were largely built on the concept of partnership,
not counterparty. When attorneys parse it, they could
make it sound different, but the concept is working
together to a common end so that we can all make
money. It seems to me that the idea of being

Id. at 11.
See id. at 10 (“Disclosure for a treaty becomes a broader duty, in respect to terms of the
proposed treaty, its interplay with other reinsurances and the nature of primary policies to
be produced, and its probable use in the future, as well as all pertinent information about
past loss experience to which the treaty as a whole is likely to be subject.”).
134 See id. at 10 (overviewing common disclosure requirements).
135 Id. at 9.
132
133
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counterparties gives the impression of more, “I’m in it
to make money, and if you happen to, fine.” A true
partnership relates to the idea of bank balancing.136
Consider also this description: “Utmost good faith speaks to fair
dealing . . . . [I]t frequently animates an agreement to cancel or
reform when a reinsurance is shown to be manifestly unfair or
unreasonably burdensome to either party, regardless of reason or
fault.”137 The principle articulated here departs sharply from the
contract law doctrines of mistake and impracticability, with their
restrictive limits on the possibility of relieving a party of its
obligations when that party faces unanticipated hardship. Under
the doctrines of mutual mistake and impracticability, for instance,
a contract may be rescinded only when one of its basic assumptions
has failed to hold and the adversely affected party does not bear the
risk of the mistake or the supervening event.138 Market conditions
or a party’s financial condition are normally not grounds for
rescission.139 Courts rarely conclude that a contract should be
rescinded because its performance has turned out to be burdensome
for one party. They usually find that a contract has explicitly or
implicitly assigned the risk of the occurrence to the complaining
party. In particular, a party that concludes a contract aware that
she has limited knowledge is deemed to bear the risk.140
Given that reinsurance contracts specifically seek to allocate
risk—they are entered into to deal with the fact that future states
are unknown—they therefore fall squarely within the category of
contracts that could not, as a rule, be rescinded when events unfold
differently than one party hoped they would. It is thus surprising
that parties to reinsurance contracts understood the contractual
duty of utmost good faith to include a duty to reallocate risk between
themselves ex post. This aspect of their obligations is buttressed by
the typical arbitration agreement, discussed in greater detail below,
under which arbitrators are not to interpret the contract literally

136 Interview (Aug. 15, 2019). The concept of bank balancing is explained below. See infra
notes 137–139 and accompanying text.
137 Kramer, supra note 127, at 11.
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 152 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
139 Id. § 152 cmt. B, § 261 cmt. B.
140 Id. § 154.
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but to construe it as an honorable engagement.141 The parties
therefore bound themselves in advance to have norms of equity
govern their relationship, creating the possibility of having ex post
reallocations imposed on them. The open-ended nature of this
obligation is captured by the words of an industry expert who wrote
in 1980 that agreements to be bound by utmost good faith “are so
delicate in character and so susceptible of abuse that unusual
precautions must be observed by both parties in their
implementation.”142
The utmost good faith duty is related to the conception of the
reinsurance relationship as an honorable engagement.143 One
interview subject explained the relationship as follows:
[T]he reinsurer also owes a duty of utmost good faith—
to act honorably and not to play fast and loose. There is
no definition as to what exactly “honorable
engagement” means. That’s the creative part of being a
reinsurance attorney: words like that give you a lot of
leeway to argue what you want to persuade the
arbitration panel, that a result would be equitable even
if not compelled by the explicit language of the
contract.144
The reinsurer’s obligation to follow the fortunes of the cedent—
which was considered an implied term even when not expressly
included in a contract—also has obscure boundaries.145 Reinsurance
treaties obligated the reinsurer to cover the underlying policies on
See infra notes 149–160 and accompanying text.
Kramer, supra note 127, at 9.
143 See id. at 11 (“By its nature, a contract of reinsurance cannot anticipate every
contingency which can arise. If it could, the utmost good faith maxim and others of the same
invocatory nature (‘following the fortunes,’ and the reinsurance contract as an ‘honorable
engagement’) would have no traditional place in reinsurance.”).
144 Interview (Aug. 22, 2019).
145 See Brady & Monin, supra note 107, at 535 (noting that follow the fortune is a “concept
often implied in reinsurance arrangements even when not specifically included”). Compare
Interview (July 30, 2019) (“No one knows what ‘follow the fortunes’ means. It has been
variously interpreted.”), with Interview (Aug. 22, 2019) (“The concept is: if the insurance
company conducts a reasonably diligent investigation and the settlement is reasonable, the
reinsurer has to pay its share of the claim . . . . The basic concept is well understood. I disagree
vehemently that it lends informality or ambiguity to the process. It’s an implied term in all
reinsurance contracts.”).
141
142
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the terms of those policies, unless aspects of coverage are explicitly
excluded from the reinsurance.146 But the duty to follow the
fortunes, according to some accounts, expanded the reinsurer’s
coverage obligation by requiring the reinsurer to cover the good
faith claims decisions of the cedent, including payments made as
gestures of good will and compromise payments.147 Under this view,
as long as there was a reasonable basis for deciding to pay a claim,
then the reinsurer was obliged to cover the loss even if it was
indisputably not within the scope of the treaty.148 There were
divergent views and recurring conflicts over whether losses that
were acknowledged not to be covered by the underlying policy had
to be covered under follow the fortunes when paid as a gesture of
goodwill or to avoid litigation.149 Disputes arose about how
deferential “follow the fortunes” required the reinsurer to be to the
ceding company’s claims determinations and its expenses related to
claims handling. For example, when a cedent had successfully
defended a coverage lawsuit—thus establishing that the claim was
outside the scope of the underlying policy—was the reinsurer
obliged to cover litigation expenses?150

See FEER, APPROACH TO REINSURANCE, supra note 58, at 33 (outlining reinsurers’
liabilities under a reinsurance treaty).
147 See Kramer, supra note 127, at 12 (discussing the concept of follow the fortunes and its
implications for reinsurance coverage).
148 See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 17.04 (2d ed. 2014)
(explaining reinsurers’ obligations under the follow the fortunes doctrine (citing North River
Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1210–12 (3d Cir. 1995))).
149 Compare Kramer, supra note 127, at 12 (stating that follow the fortunes does not
undermine explicit limitations or exclusions in the reinsurance treaty), with Interview (Nov.
21, 2019) (explaining that sometimes follow the fortunes is interpreted as requiring coverage
of losses that are explicitly excluded), and infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing
the 1906 San Francisco fire). See also Tilmann J. Röder, The History of Contract Practice and
Conflict Resolution in Reinsurance, in MANAGING RISK IN REINSURANCE: FROM CITY FIRES TO
GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 72, at 182, 189 (“This issue of a reinsurer’s obligation to
indemnify the insurer when the latter had paid a claim as a gesture of goodwill (where the
original insured did not have a valid claim) led to conflicts.”). An illustrative statement of the
principle in a modern treatise shows why it has long been considered confusing: “Follow the
fortunes obligates reinsurers to indemnify cedents for ceded losses that arguably fall within
the scope of the underlying’s policy’s coverage, even if not technically covered by the policy.”
Robert L. Haig, New York Practice Series § 91:39 (5th ed. 2020).
150 See Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Const. Reinsurance Corp., 626 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Mass. 1994)
(determining whether legal expenses incurred during the defense of a declaratory judgment
brought by the insured should be covered).
146
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The Great San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906 illustrates
the complexities inherent in the follow the fortunes principle and
the kind of intractable, high-stakes disagreements to which it is
susceptible, particularly among a trading group transacting across
cultures. The earthquake, one of the deadliest in United States
history, caused fires lasting several days; over 3,000 people died,
and more than eighty percent of the city was destroyed.151 San
Francisco properties were insured against fire by United States and
European insurers and primarily reinsured by European
reinsurers; earthquake insurance did not exist.
The European custom at the time was that fire caused by
earthquakes was excluded from fire insurance coverage. Some of the
policies written in San Francisco said so unambiguously, but others
were less clear.152 Nonetheless, the position of the European
insurers and reinsurers was that, as evidenced by custom and
practice in Europe, fire caused by earthquake was outside the scope
of coverage. California public and elite opinion, and the California
courts, rejected this position.153 A second difficulty was that it was
often impossible to distinguish earthquake damage from fire
damage. Public opinion was quickly mobilized against the mostly
foreign insurers.154 The local real estate industry organized an effort
to deemphasize the earthquake and emphasize the fire.155

See JAMES ET AL, supra note 65, at 267 (discussing the damage caused by the San
Francisco earthquake).
152 See ELEANORA ROHLAND, SHARING THE RISK: FIRE, CLIMATE, AND DISASTER—SWISS RE
1864–1906, at 111 (2011) (explaining that insurers in San Francisco created an unclear legal
situation by using various earthquake and fire clauses).
153 Juries in lawsuits against primary insurers decided on causation in a way that broke
the proximate cause link between the earthquake and the fire, thereby attributing losses to
the fire alone and finding against insurers. See id. at 120 (discussing the role of the jury in
the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake); see also JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 12
(“The experience of the San Francisco earthquake was a defining moment in showing that a
resilient insurance network could survive enormous claims, legal challenges and a political
environment which pushed it to pay on claims for which it did not regard itself liable.”); BÄHR
& KOPPER, supra note 115, at 70 (discussing the effects of public outrage against insurers
following the San Francisco earthquake).
154 See BÄHR & KOPPER, supra note 115, at 70–71 (discussing public outrage following the
disaster and how this outrage was turned on foreign insurance companies).
155 See ROHLAND, supra note 152, at 119 (explaining that the Real Estate Board of San
Francisco passed resolutions to refer to the disaster as “the great fire” instead of “the great
earthquake”).
151
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The intense popular, regulatory, and legal pressures exerted on
primary insurers—erupting in violent attacks on insurance
company employees—led many insurers to decide to pay claims that
they and their reinsurers agreed were not covered rather than fight
what appeared to be a costly and futile war. Some insurers chose
instead to withdraw from the United States market, but many
direct insurers decided to pay all losses except where serious
earthquake damage could be proved.156 Even firms whose policies
unambiguously excluded fire caused by earthquake paid claims,
including in some firms for damage caused solely by the
earthquake.157 Reinsurers disagreed about whether the follow the
fortunes principle obliged them to indemnify primary insurers for
such payments.158 Most eventually did, while those that did not
exited the United States market.159 The first reinsurance textbook,
published in 1980, captures the continued ambiguity of the “follow
the fortunes” principle at that time, calling it the “feature of the
reinsurance relationship [most] subject to ingenuous exaggeration”
and, while stating that “the concept of follow fortunes cannot create
a reinsurance where none exists,” acknowledges that “[h]ow far
outside pure indemnification or payment of an insured loss . . . this
absolute reinsurance liability goes has never been fully spelled out
. . . .”160
3. Purely Extralegal Obligations. In addition to the vague
obligations of utmost good faith and follow the fortunes, the parties
to reinsurance relationships had expectations of one another that
were entirely unwritten and extralegal but considered obligatory.
These obligations were embodied in a concept known as the bank.
Although contracts were written on an annual basis, either with a
right to cancel or a right to renew, it was considered a breach of duty
to cancel or decline to renew when one party had paid substantially
See BÄHR & KOPPER, supra note 115, at 70–71 (explaining that following the
earthquake, some insurers agreed to pay all losses in full, others withdrew from the United
States market entirely, and the majority agreed to pay a set percentage for certain damages).
157 See ROHLAND, supra note 152, at 110–20 (explaining that despite “clearly formulated
clauses employed in the insurers’ policies to exclude damage caused by earthquakes,” many
firms agreed to pay claims).
158 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 167 (discussing the follow the fortunes clause in the
context of the San Francisco earthquake).
159 See BÄHR & KOPPER, supra note 115, at 71 (noting which firms made payments and
which exited the United States market).
160 Kramer, supra note 127, at 12–13.
156
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more into the parties’ transactional bank than it had withdrawn.
The bank consisted of the cedent’s premium payments and the
reinsurer’s payments of covered losses. Market participants
describe the bank as follows:
It was viewed as a long-term relationship; the ceding
company would make it up in the next transaction until
everyone made their anticipated profit over the long
term . . . . If the ceding company ran off and got a
different reinsurer, then they would be pariahs because
everybody knew one another. If the reinsurer enjoys a
huge profit and then pulls the plug, the reinsurer would
be a pariah.161
In the old days, the reinsurer and the insurance
company would have a concept that a bank is built or
didn’t have any money in it. If the reinsurer was losing
money, the cedent felt an obligation to make the
reinsurer whole. If it was making too much, the
reinsurer felt an obligation to turn some of it over. They
didn’t forget they had made a whole lot of money. That
changed. Today, people don’t think in terms of a bank.
In the old days, balancing the bank was a relationship
norm and a matter of integrity, which existed in the old
days unlike today. Ethics, being dependable, being a
person of your word.162
A market participant who has been based in Lloyd’s of London
since the 1970s described the concept of bank colorfully:
Everything was written for twelve months at a time, but
the understanding was that once you’ve shaken hands,
you’ve forged a partnership. It’s like living together
rather than getting married. You hoped you’d judged
your man well. This was the typical understanding
between the reinsurer and the ceding company . . . .
Information spreads like venereal disease. The person

161
162

Interview (Aug. 22, 2019).
Interview (Aug. 15, 2019).
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you [cheated] tells everyone. People go to coffee;
everyone talks. You didn’t need a media, Internet,
website. Word of mouth was good enough. This would
include declining to renew a treaty. You had to
demonstrate a powerful reason why you didn’t renew
the partnership. Legitimate business reasons, like that
you were overtaken by a new chief executive or chief
underwriting officer with a new underwriting
philosophy. If you just casually said, “I’ve made a ton of
money out of you; I’m going to dump you now,” that was
the sort of anarchic behavior being controlled by these
principles of continuity.163
The bank balancing obligation, then, was not an obligation that
would be raised for adjudication in an arbitration.164 Nonetheless, it
was considered binding just as the parties’ explicit obligations
were.165
4. Equitable Private Dispute Resolution. Rarely were parties to a
reinsurance treaty unable to resolve a dispute through
negotiations.166 When negotiations failed, disputes were
adjudicated by non-lawyer arbitrators drawn from the insurance
sector—current or retired executives with experience in reinsurance
transactions—who were empowered by the typical arbitration
clause in reinsurance treaties to consider the agreement as an
“honorable engagement” or “gentlemen’s agreement” rather than a
strict legal obligation. Arbitrators were to determine the outcome by

Interview (Aug. 9, 12 & 13, 2019); see also Interview (July 30, 2019) (“The relationship
was assumed to be self-correcting, based on equilibrium. You’re probably too young to
remember in the 1970s these aquariums that didn’t need to be maintained. The concept was
payback. If the reinsurer got behind because of claims, it would charge more in the next years
and make it up; or if claims were low, it would share commissions . . . . Ceding companies got
a reputation for hopping around and were charged more for doing that.”).
164 Interview (Aug. 15, 2019).
165 While the norm of bank balancing is no longer as strong as it was in the past, it continues
to influence behavior. See JARZABKOWSKI ET AL., supra note 79, at 41 (quoting from an
interview with a reinsurer relaying a story about an insurer that declined the reinsurer’s
offer to provide reinsurance at a lower premium because the insurer was loyal to its
reinsurers that had paid a large claim and wanted to “try to give some payback”).
166 See Brady & Monin, supra note 107, at 529 (“Prior to the 1980s, there were few
reinsurance disputes, and almost all were resolved informally.”); Interview (Aug. 22, 2019);
Interview (Nov. 7, 2019); Interview (Aug. 14 & Aug. 20, 2019).
163
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inferring on the basis of context, course of dealing, course of
performance, and industry practice, what outcome the parties must
have intended.167 For example, a typical clause from the 1970s
provided:
The Arbitrators shall interpret this Agreement as an
honorable engagement and not as merely a legal
obligation. They are relieved of all judicial formalities
and may abstain from following strict rules of law. They
will make their award with a view to effecting the
general purpose of the Agreement in a reasonable
manner rather than in accordance with the literal
interpretation of the language.168
Judicial enforcement of arbitration awards was rarely pursued
because of confidentiality concerns.169 As one former reinsurance
executive and arbitrator explained:
A lot of the presumption was “we don’t want to air the
dirty laundry” . . . . Reinsurers didn’t want people to
know that they were disputing claims, and primary
167 BÄHR & KOPPER, supra note 115, at 4; Interview (Nov. 21, 2019). The earliest
reinsurance treaties, concluded in Italy, Germany, and France in the mid-nineteenth century,
included arbitration clauses. See KOPF, supra note 56, at 29, 36 (stating that provisions for
settlement of disputes by arbitration were included in German, French, and Italian
contracts).
168 Thomas D. Crittenden, Is Arbitration a Viable Alternative to Litigation? What May or
Must Be Arbitrated? A Reinsurance Perspective, 13 F. 223, 226–27 (1977).
169 See Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne Reinsurance Co., 552 N.E.2d 139, 140
(N.Y. 1990) (“This appeal calls upon us to resolve a question of reinsurance law—a field in
which differences have often been settled by handshakes and umpires, and pertinent
precedents of this court are few in number.”). The private ordering literature sometimes
conflates private ordering in the shadow of the law with truly “stateless” commerce. Just
because contracting parties do not litigate does not mean that their knowledge of the
availability of the law to enforce their contract does not shape the way they interact with one
another. See RICHMAN, supra note 52, at 5 (citing Mark Galanter’s point that the “principal
contribution of courts to dispute resolution is providing a background of norms and
procedures against which negotiations . . . take place”). However, the features of treaty
reinsurance suggest that much of it fell in the category of what Richman calls “stateless
commerce,” at least until the middle of the twentieth century. Id. at 3. The contracts were
often international contracts during a time when the hurdles to enforcing such contracts were
high, and confidentiality concerns kept parties out of court, including for the purpose of
enforcing arbitration awards. Id.
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insurers didn’t want their insureds to know that their
reinsurance might not be solid. The reinsurer didn’t
want to get the reputation of being a difficult claims
payer. Sometimes it would just settle if it was a good
client. I’m not aware of any arbitration award that
needed to be enforced. No one would contest an award
because of confidentiality concerns.170
Another account by an industry insider written as late as 1977
states that reinsurers were reticent to take their disputes with
clients to arbitration and that arbitrations were still rare.171
Moreover, reinsurance arbitration was less formal than the
arbitration in the private legal systems described in the private
ordering literature.172 It did not take place under the auspices of an
arbitral organization or a tribunal with predetermined rules and
procedures.173 Reinsurance arbitration was entirely ad hoc, with
170 Interview (July 30, 2019). A Westlaw search of all state and federal court decisions and
trial court orders before 1980 containing the terms “arbitration” and “reinsurance” yielded
fewer than twenty-eight orders and opinions in which a party to a reinsurance treaty between
a professional reinsurer and a primary insurer invoked an arbitration agreement. A handful
of these were actions to enforce an arbitration award. Most were cases in which one party
sought to litigate and the other sought a stay of proceedings or a motion to compel arbitration
because of the arbitration agreement. Many were cases in which a defendant primary insurer
impleaded a reinsurer.
171 See Crittenden, supra note 168, at 234 (noting limited arbitration in reinsurance “as a
consequence of the amicable spirit”); see also Brady & Monin, supra note 107, at 529 (“Prior
to the 1980s, there were few reinsurance disputes, and almost all were resolved informally.”).
The interview subjects who started their careers before 1980 seemed to take pride in having
never or rarely been involved in arbitration or litigation. See, e.g., Interview (Aug. 14, 2019);
Interview (Aug. 20, 2019) (“Since I’ve been in the business I’ve only appeared in front of an
arbitrator once. I was brought in as an expert witness. You try never to get there.”); Interview
(Aug. 16, 2019) (“I used to be responsible for claims operations and would bend over
backwards to avoid a dispute.”); see also Interview (July 30, 2019) (“A lot of the presumption
was ‘we don’t want to air the dirty laundry, and we don’t want the relationship to be
undermined.’ Reinsurers didn’t want people to know that they were disputing claims, and
primary insurers didn’t want their insureds to know that their reinsurance might not be solid.
The reinsurer didn’t want to get the reputation of being difficult claims players.”). Compare
that attitude to the one expressed by the general counsel of a reinsurance company, who
started working in the industry after 1980: “I have no problem with going to arbitration or
litigation with somebody; if you need to, you do.” Interview (Aug. 14, 2019).
172 The grain and feed industry, for instance, has a strong arbitration structure. See
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 23, at 1769–70 (describing arbitrators’ “formalistic
approach to adjudication”).
173 Other studies of similar industries, by contrast, do show use of private legal systems.
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procedures set by the parties and the arbitrators for each dispute.174
Arbitration awards were not published,175 and there was no trade
organization wielding the threat of expulsion or shaming of a trader
who did not comply with an arbitration award.176
Despite the vague standards governing these contracts, the
amorphous obligations of utmost good faith and follow the fortunes,
and the unpredictability one would expect from arbitration
conducted under a standard that liberates arbitrators from
conventional standards of contract interpretation and legal rules,
parties resolved nearly all disputes without turning to a third-party
adjudicator.177
C. WHY EXTRALEGALITY AND INFORMALITY IN REINSURANCE
CONTRACTS

Judicial enforcement of reinsurance agreements was practically
unavailable for at least two reasons. First, the desire to avoid
publicizing details of one’s business acted as a barrier to publicizing
disputes by pursuing litigation or even judicial enforcement of

See, e.g., id. at 1769 (presenting the private legal system among grain and feed traders “to
resolve contract disputes among its members”); Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra
note 23, at 1726 (analyzing the “numerous sources of private commercial law in the domestic
cash markets for the purchase and sale of cotton”). Not until the 1990s did a group of
reinsurance executives draft a set of model arbitration procedures, and the industry has been
slow to adopt them. See, e.g., Edmond F. Rondepierre, ARIAS US Will Serve the International
Insurance and Reinsurance Law Community, ARIAS US Q. (ARIAS US, Mount Vernon, N.Y.),
Dec. 1994, at 2 (intending to “set[] forth recommended standards and rules of arbitration”).
174 See, e.g., Miloš Vec, Reinsurance Law as an Autonomous Regulatory Regime?, in
MANAGING RISK IN REINSURANCE: FROM CITY FIRES TO GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 72, at
206, 225 (describing the “autonomous conflict resolution through arbitration tribunals”).
175 I have found only one published arbitration award, printed in 1913. See William Otis
Badger, Jr., Latest Insurance Decisions Discussed, BEST’S INS. NEWS, at 20–21 (June 16, 1913)
(reporting the award and decision). Interview subjects confirmed that they were unaware of
publication of arbitration awards. (Aug. 16, 2019). They also said that information about
arbitrations did not typically spread through gossip. Id.
176 Other similar industries, by contrast, do have trade organizations leading arbitration
enforcement. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 23, at 1769 (indicating “the
National Grain and Feed Association”); Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 23,
at 1725 (indicating “the Liverpool Cotton Association”); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 1,
at 119 (indicating “the New York Diamond Dealers Club”).
177 See, e.g., Brady & Monin, supra note 107, at 529 (relating the “accepted code of conduct”
which led to “few disputes” arising).
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arbitration awards.178 Mentions of this secrecy interest pervade
industry histories, and interview subjects confirmed that
confidentiality was an important reason parties did not want to
resolve disputes judicially.179 In addition, reinsurers were concerned
about signaling that they were excessively resistant to paying
claims.180
Courts were in practice unsuitable for a second reason: the
uncertainty and complexity inherent in reinsurance arrangements.
This source of informality in the way transactions were concluded
and managed also drove parties to avoid courts.181 Highly specified,
explicit contracting was not the optimal method of sustaining trade
in reinsurance because it was too costly to imagine and specify rules

See Crittenden, supra note 168, at 226 (“Confidentiality is an important aspect.”);
Tilmann J. Röder, From Gentlemen’s Agreement to Judicial Instrument: The History of
Contract Practice and Conflict Resolution in Reinsurance, in MANAGING RISK IN
REINSURANCE: FROM CITY FIRES TO GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 72, at 182, 194 (recounting
the advantages of “avoid[ing] revealing the details of their business to a court and, thus, to
the competition”); cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1888 (2000) (discussing the interest in keeping sensitive business
information confidential as a reason that firms do not sue).
179 See, e.g., Pearson, Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 71 (characterizing an initial
cautious approach “given the legal uncertainties”); Kyrtsis, supra note 94, at 151–52
(underscoring the potential for “problems in the contracts among competitors who were
unwilling to share the information that any sensible risk assessment would require”);
HAUETER, supra note 82, at 23 (tying the reinsurance industry’s beginnings to the previous
“practice require[ing] competitors to grant each other access to their books”); THOMPSON &
RALPH, supra note 63, at 158 (bemoaning the early problem of “the reassured [having] to
divulge the name of its assureds when it applied to another company for reinsurance”); KOPF,
supra note 56, at 28 (characterizing early reinsurance as transfers of business which insurers
“felt they could not keep to other insurers by means of direct contracts between the other
companies and the insured”); FEER, APPROACH TO REINSURANCE, supra note 58, at 19
(recounting the separate relationships between the reinsurer and “the original assured and
the Ceding Company”); Interview (Aug. 2, 2019) (stating that reinsurance contracting parties
chose arbitration because it was confidential, they could choose an adjudicator with expertise,
and they could control the procedure); Interview (July 30, 2019) (“A lot of the presumption
was ‘we don’t want to air the dirty laundry, and we don’t want the relationship to be
undermined.’ Reinsurers didn’t want people to know that they were disputing claims, and
primary insurers didn’t want their insureds to know that their reinsurance might not be solid.
The reinsurers didn’t want to get the reputation of being difficult claims players.”).
180 Interview (Aug. 1 & 2, 2019).
181 See Macaulay, supra note 22, at 56 (discussing that planning “for as many contingencies
as can be foreseen” and “the existence or use of . . . legal sanctions to induce performance . . .
or to compensate for non-performance” are critical dimensions of measuring formality).
178
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for allocating losses under all possible scenarios that might arise.182
It would also have been costly to verify to a non-expert court
whether obligations had been met.183 The first reinsurance textbook
published explained:
Behind every custom and usage that distinguish
reinsurance from insurance, a practical business reason
can be found. This background implies an intimate
relationship and concurrence of interests between
insurer and reinsurer which is, indeed, the most
distinguishing characteristic of the business. If
reinsurance were done entirely at arm’s length, the
resulting costs of monitoring, verifying, and otherwise
supervising the substantial transactions that
characterize reinsurance would effectively destroy its
utility as we know it today.184
Reinsurance contract obligations were costly to verify to
generalist courts because those courts lacked the contextual
knowledge needed to determine whether the parties upheld their
obligations.185 The obligation of utmost good faith requires that the
cedent act with complete honesty, disclose all information material
to the risk undertaken both initially and after the reinsurance
contract is formed, and be diligent in underwriting and in handling
182 See Robert E. Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 114
YALE L.J. 814, 838 (2006) (discussing how parties reduce the front-end costs of writing
specified contracts by delegating back-end decision making about vague terms to an
adjudicator).
183 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 558 (2003)
(discussing the preference for arbitration when obligations are hard to specify or to verify to
non-experts).
184 Kramer, supra note 127, at 9.
185 See Röder, supra note 178, at 193–94 (noting that resolving contracts autonomously
allowed parties to “choose an arbitrator acquainted with what was customary in the
industry”); Interview (Nov. 20, 2019) (“Parties used arbitration because they saw their
relationships as unique and esoteric, and courts wouldn’t understand . . . . A lot of what
happens in these contracts is there’s a lot of gloss that requires someone familiar with the
industry to understand what it means. It’s easy to talk about follow the fortunes or utmost
good faith. But what that means in practice can be difficult to understand in a given situation.
Courts won’t have any idea how this should work and will apply it too broadly or say ‘this is
ridiculous’ and give it no credence.”).
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claims covered by the reinsurance contract.186 The reinsurer
commits itself to paying claims as the cedent pays them.187 It is not,
in the ordinary course, to question the cedent’s claims processing
and payment decisions, and it is to pay claims paid reasonably and
in good faith by the cedent even if the claim is outside the scope of
coverage, as if the reinsurer were a party to the underlying primary
insurance contract.188 Assessing whether opportunism by one party
or the other has occurred under these standards or what coverage
determination is reasonable in novel factual circumstances requires
a deep understanding of the business and of common practice.
An example from a reinsurance executive illustrates a novel
situation of the kind that arose repeatedly and called for contextual
interpretation of facts and reasonable expectations about risk
allocation between a cedent and a reinsurer:
You learn something from . . . every catastrophe, and
it’s usually something that wasn’t anticipated. There
was a hurricane over Houston . . . it stopped and rained
over Houston for days. There was an hours clause in the
contract, and this storm went on beyond the hours
clause. It wasn’t anticipated that a single storm might
do this. Another one: a hurricane hit Texas and went up
into the United States, then turned around and went
back and hit Texas a second time. Was that one
occurrence or two? Another example is a winter storm.
You have a condition that occurred a couple of years ago
in the northeast, where the temperature never went
above freezing but you had three to four winter storms
in that time. Was it the first snowflake that caused the
roof to collapse or the last because there was an
See Salm, supra note 107, at 99–100 (discussing how the “good faith” obligation creates
an “honorable engagement” between the parties where both must “exercise their
responsibilities in a manner reflecting the highest level of integrity”).
187 See id. at 100 (stating that “the reinsurer is obliged to pay as the company pays”).
188 See id. (noting that a company can “adjust and settle claims to its own best judgment,
and the reinsurer is obliged to pay as the company pays”); Kramer, supra note 127, at 13 (The
reinsurer is “bound by the loss settlements of the ceding insurer, including compromise, ex
gratia payments, and the like”). Yet this requirement is to apply to unanticipated situations
and not ordinarily to undermine explicit exclusions from the reinsurance contract. Kramer,
supra note 127, at 12. However, in some cases the obligation can override explicit clauses in
the reinsurance contract. Interview (Nov. 21, 2019).
186

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

47

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 [2022], Art. 5

280

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:233

accumulation of snow on the roof? These are things that
are open to question.189
To deal with such uncertainties that they did not trust courts to
handle competently, traders devised alternative contracting and
institutional devices to support trade. Traders allocated
transactional risk and aligned incentives, committed to information
disclosure, made targeted relationship-specific investments,
delegated equitable adjudication power to expert arbitrators from
the insurance field, and built a global network to channel
information that supported reputation-based governance.

IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REINSURANCE CONTRACTING
A. THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF THE REINSURANCE MARKET

Optimal insurance firm size and geographic scope are functions
of the costs of monitoring agents and policyholders. Constraints
include agents’ honesty, diligence in underwriting, and claims
processing and knowledge of local or sector-specific conditions that
historically enabled insurers to assess risk and monitor
policyholders for moral hazard and claims fraud.190 While those
factors exert downward pressure on firm size and scope, prudence
in risk spreading puts upward pressure on the total value of risks a
given firm seeks to underwrite and optimal diversity of risk.191 For
solvency, an insurance company must limit its exposure to any
single risk as a percentage of the total value of risks it has
underwritten.192 This limits an insurer’s ability to take risks above
a certain value relative to its size. Compounding the benefits of the
capacity to underwrite large risks is the desire of clients to deal with
fewer insurers rather than many. This factor drives insurance
companies to develop the capacity to write large policies to capture
more market share of both large and small policies.193 Reinsurance
Interview (Aug. 14 & 20, 2019).
See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 6, 24 (overviewing the history of risk organization).
191 See id. at 6–7 (explaining risk spreading and the qualities required to establish a stable
reinsurance business system).
192 See FEER, TREATY REINSURANCE IN FIRE INSURANCE, supra note 62, at 8 (explaining how
the law of averages operates in particular classes if a company does not endeavor to limit its
liability on all policies issued on certain classes).
193 See, e.g., THOMPSON & RALPH, supra note 63, at 159 (describing the capacity of
189
190
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increases the underwriting capacity of a given insurer, which allows
the insurer to better match its underwriting capacity to its
economies of scale in managing customer relationships while
remaining at a size that facilitates optimal monitoring of agents and
policyholders.194
Reinsurance can also provide financial stabilization to insurers
serving local or sector-specific markets, as was historically the
norm.195 Insurers face the challenge of correlated risk that arises in
particular with insurers that serve a limited geographic market.196
The problem of correlation of geographically concentrated risks
became unmanageable for local insurance societies with the rising
frequency of large-scale fires during the Industrial Revolution.197
Reinsurance as an identifiable industry was created in response to
this problem.198 The earliest reinsurance firms underwrote risks
across thousands of locations.199 Reinsurance was, therefore, an
early industry to globalize.200

reinsurance companies to efficiently handle millions of dollars in business); Kramer, supra
note 127, at 29 (“The gross capacity demands of the insurance market are unyielding. As a
practical marketing matter, most insurers are obliged to accept sums insured which exceed
the net retained limits within which the law of large numbers will work . . . .”); FEER,
APPROACH TO REINSURANCE, supra note 58, at 7 (explaining the effects of large treaties in
establishing financial relations between parties).
194 See Robert A. Baker, The Purpose of Reinsurance, in REINSURANCE 34 (1980)
(“Reinsurance is useful for marketing reasons because it enables an insurance company to
write policies for monetary amounts substantially greater than those it could afford to write
in the absence of reinsurance.”); see also Kramer, supra note 127, at 29 (“Fundamentally, the
choice of a reinsurance program is in the context of an underwriting and marketing support
function.”).
195 See Baker, supra note 194, at 35 (explaining how Reinsurance provides financial
stabilization).
196 See FEER, APPROACH TO REINSURANCE, supra note 58, at 8 (discussing how market
conditions can “compel a company to issue policies for larger amounts that it can prudently
retain,” which can raise the challenge of correlated risk).
197 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 44–45 (discussing the effects of fires in the
nineteenth century on the insurance industry).
198 See id. at 44 (noting that the large-scale fire disasters “revealed a number of serious
shortcomings in existing underwriting practice and must have made insurers all too aware
of the need for a strong reinsurance institution”).
199 See id. at 44–45 (describing the global spread of the reinsurance industry).
200 See KOPF, supra note 56, at 31–32 (overviewing the globalization of the reinsurance
industry).
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B. REINSURANCE CONTRACTING HAZARDS

The central contracting problems of reinsurance mirror those in
insurance generally: asymmetric information, adverse selection,
and moral hazard. The reinsured’s concern is that the reinsurer will
be unwilling or unable to cover its losses when they are incurred.201
The reinsurer’s concern is that the primary insurer will reinsure its
worst risks or, after ceding a class of risks to a reinsurer, take on
unduly high risk because that risk is reinsured and either
misrepresent the quality of the risk to the reinsurer or fail to
exercise due diligence in underwriting or in paying claims.202 In the
most extreme cases, primary insurers might engage in outright
fraud, falsifying policies and claims and using them to collect
payments from reinsurers.203 Widespread adverse selection and
moral hazard arose early in the development of the reinsurance
industry.204 The first specialist reinsurance firms faced difficulties
that to modern eyes are unsurprising: primary insurers reinsured

201 FEER, TREATY REINSURANCE IN FIRE INSURANCE, supra note 62, at 19 (“A company
therefore will select its reinsurers principally for their financial strength and their reputation
. . . . A reinsurer writing too large a premium volume in comparison with his surplus and
capital is as undesirable as one who is known for his attempts to deny liability at the slightest
provocation.”).
202 See THOMPSON & RALPH, supra note 63, at 167 (“The reinsurers . . . often suffer because
the ceding companies, for competitive or other reasons, do not collect sufficient premiums,
quite apart from the prevailing tendency to reinsure as much as possible of under-rated risks,
so that in this latter case the reinsurer has also to make up for the deficiency in the tariff
rate. This latter naturally does not constitute reinsurance but rather its abuse, similar to
when, for instance, heavily reinsured risks in the event of claims are settled too liberally.”).
203 See RONALD L. SOBLE & ROBERT E. DALLOS, THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: THE EQUITY
FUNDING STORY, THE FRAUD OF THE CENTURY 18–19 (1975) (explaining how a massive fraud
was committed against reinsurers in 1973 by one primary insurer that created fake direct
policies and ceded them to reinsurers to collect benefits).
204 See SWISS RE, A HISTORY OF INSURANCE 11 (2017) (explaining how shareholding for
insurance was supposed to become an ideal way to raise operating capital for business
expansion purposes); see also JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 2 (“Insurance is in practice not
easy to organize because of several well-known problems. Two issues that were identified
already in the earliest days of insurance relate to individual policies: adverse selection (for
instance, those who know they have potential medical problems are most likely to seek health
insurance, though the insurer may not be aware of the heightened risk); and moral hazard,
the tendency of those insured to be less careful (those with reinsurance are less worried if
their house burns down, and so take fewer steps to prevent it).”); BÄHR & KOPPER, supra note
115, at 38–40 (providing a historical explanation of the effects of industrialization on the
industry).
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their worst risks.205 Information asymmetries were exacerbated in
reinsurance because of the monitoring constraints inherent in the
necessity of spreading of risk across thousands of locations in dozens
of countries.206
C. CONTRACT GOVERNANCE WITHOUT THE COURT OR THE CLAN

Such imperfect information about the capabilities and
trustworthiness of potential partners increases the risk of exchange
and, absent mechanisms to resolve information asymmetries,
prevents some value-creating transactions from occurring. To
address these challenges, participants in the reinsurance trade
relied on a set of extralegal governance mechanisms.207 They
developed a variety of techniques to initiate bilateral cooperation
despite the threats of adverse selection and moral hazard, to extend
their cooperation to higher-stakes and more varied transactions,
and to lengthen the shadow of the future by creating a business
network that facilitated the spread of information about behavior
and performance in trading relationships.
1. Incentive Alignment. Three ubiquitous features of reinsurance
contracts were adopted early by successful firms in response to
widespread adverse selection and moral hazard and then were
copied by other firms. First, treaty reinsurance came to dominate
reinsurance because it regulates these problems better than
facultative reinsurance.208 That is because the ceding company is
obligated to keep a share of every policy in the entire portfolio and
to cede a share of every policy to the reinsurer.209 In treaty
reinsurance, the ceding company does not select on a policy-bypolicy basis which risks to cede and which to hold.210 The reinsurer
205 See HAUETER, supra note 82, at 23 (“Many insurers could not resist offloading their
worst risks onto reinsurers, or charging reinsurers excessively for the cost of acquiring
business.”).
206 See id. (noting that international business expansion forced reinsurers to “rely on the
word of their clients or brokers” to gather information on risks in each area).
207 See infra Section IV.C.3 (discussing reputation-based and network-based governance).
208 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 166–67 (discussing the benefits of moving away from
facultative insurance); Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 83
(identifying the rise of treaty reinsurance).
209 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 166 (“Both parties would commit to cede and cover
the agreed risks.”).
210 See id. (noting treaty insurance, unlike facultative insurance, does not allow the direct
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pays a percentage of each claim in the category of policies described
in the treaty.211 Under pro rata share treaty reinsurance,
historically the most common form, each party bears a proportion of
the risk equal to its proportion of the premiums.212
Second, the retention requirement further ameliorated moral
hazard. A reinsurer rarely took 100 percent of a risk.213 The
reinsured was obligated to keep on its own books a substantial
portion of the risk and to warrant that it would do so; it could not
reinsure the entire balance with other reinsurers.214 The retention
was calculated by reference to the financial strength of the ceding
company, including reference to its expected premium income,
premium reserves, and exposure.215 The level was set high enough
to show that the primary company had substantial skin in the game
but not so high that it risked being unable to pay its share of
losses.216

insurer to choose if they want the reinsurer to cover the risk on a case-by-case basis or allow
the reinsurer to decide whether to accept the risk); cf. THOMPSON & RALPH, supra note 63, at
150–51 (explaining the statistical calculations for premium amounts that reinsurers must
make when direct insurers do not chose which policies, and therefore risks, to cover).
211 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 166 (“[Q]uota share reinsurance contracts involve
the reinsurer in a percentage share of all the direct insurer's risks in a specific branch of
insurance . . . .”).
212 Ronald E. Ferguson, Reinsurance, in BASES OF REINSURANCE 52, 52–54 (Robert W.
Strain ed.).
213 See The Early Years—On the Way to the Top of the World (1880–1914), Munich Re,
https://www.munichre.com/en/group/company/history/early-years/index.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2022) (“Munich Re, an industry leader, avoiding taking all the risk all but once during
the early years of reinsurance.”).
214 See William Hoffman, Facultative Reinsurance Contract Formation, Documentation,
and Integration, 38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 763, 818–19 (2003) (noting the importance
of retention warranties and acknowledging consequences of breaching such warranty). A
reinsurer should be informed by the reassured as to the amount of insurance the reassured
is retaining for his own account and if the reassured ceases to hold the amount declared by
him before the reinsurance is completed, the reinsurance contract may become voidable. See
Trail v. Baring (1864) 66 Eng. Rep. 797, 798 (U.K) (“[I]t was the custom and understanding
upon such reassurances as the present . . . that the office effecting the reassurance should
itself retain a substantial portion of the risk covered by the original assurance . . . .”).
215 See THOMPSON & RALPH, supra note 63, at 150–51 (detailing the complex calculations
direct insurers and reinsurers use to decide shares); see also Kramer, supra note 127, at 3
(detailing the relationship between an insurer and reinsurer in terms of capacity).
216 See THOMPSON & RALPH, supra note 63, at 63, 66, 171 (noting the importance of
retention amount).
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Third, the reinsurer paid commissions to the ceding company
that increased as the loss experience under the treaty decreased. 217
These commissions included sums to cover operating expenses
together with a form of profit sharing by the reinsurer with the
reinsured.218 Before they introduced these commissions in the late
nineteenth century, reinsurers tended to contract with only a few
partners and only with companies with established reputations.219
Munich Re introduced commissions to support its strategy of
spreading risk broadly by transacting with many geographically
dispersed insurers.220 The reinsurer’s contribution to operating
costs and its commitment to share its profits with the ceding
company incentivized the latter to invest in monitoring the risks it
underwrote and in scrutinizing claims.221 The commissions,
together with retention requirements, were key to implementing
this broad risk-spreading strategy.222 Other reinsurers soon copied
this structure.223
An additional transactional structure that was more commonly
employed during times of greater uncertainty, network sparsity,
and reduced monitoring capability might also have been a means of
aligning incentives. During the infancy of reinsurance and again
after the First World War, it was common for parties to enter
See Kramer, supra note 127, at 29 (discussing why commissions could be reduced).
See Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 78 (explaining
the profit sharing relationship between cedents, reinsurers, and clients); Kyrtsis, supra note
94, at 145, 151 (describing the increase in unaffordable administrative costs and reinsurers’
role in dealing with them).
219 See Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 73–74 (describing
“small groups of managers” from different reinsurers meeting up internationally); FEER,
APPROACH TO REINSURANCE, supra note 58, at 41 (“A Company will, therefore, select its
Reinsurers principally for . . . their reputation . . . .”).
220 See The Early Years—On the Way to the Top of the World (1880–1914), supra note 213
(“International risk diversification is part of Munich Re’s corporate strategy from the outset”);
Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 78 (noting Munich Re’s
wide distribution of risks and commission system).
221 See The Early Years—On the Way to the Top of the World (1880–1914), supra note 213
(“Munich Re also shares part of its profits with partners, thus giving them an incentive to
make a careful assessment of the risk.”); Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure,
supra note 80, at 83 (detailing the mutually beneficial relationship insurers and reinsurers
developed).
222 See The Early Years—On the Way to the Top of the World (1880–1914), supra note 213
(describing Munich Re’s successful reinsurance strategy).
223 See Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 83 (noting the
industry shift to using Munich Re's new business structure).
217
218
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reciprocal reinsurance treaties.224 These deals consisted of two
reinsurance treaties of similar value, in which each party was
cedent in one treaty and reinsurer in the other.225 Dedicated
reinsurance firms entered these treaties, retroceding risks—that is,
reinsuring reinsured risks—to primary insurers.226 Reciprocal
reinsurance served as a kind of mutual hostage taking that gave
each party leverage over the other.227
These mechanisms of incentive alignment reduced the need for
trust between the parties and therefore facilitated initial
cooperation. This initial cooperation created opportunity for the
parties to observe one another, to learn about their respective
capabilities and trustworthiness, and thereby to engage in future
transactions of higher value and more varied potential
combinations of terms as they progressively established trust, as
discussed further below.
2. Investigation of Prospective and Current Counterparties.
Transacting parties chose from two different approaches to precontractual investigation. Some transactions were preceded by
extensive due diligence of the ceding company. One interview
subject explained:
[T]he transaction is not too reliant on representations
and warranties because the reinsurer is supposed to do
its underwriting of the ceding company. It is
underwriting the various functions of the ceding
company—underwriting,
claims
handling,
data
224 See Kyrtsis, supra note 94, at 158–59 (arguing that in the period during and after the
First World War, the ability to trade within reinsurance networks was disrupted first by
wartime trade restrictions and then by a variety of protectionist and nationalist economic
measures). Additionally, Kyrtsis argues that the ability to monitor counterparties was
reduced by travel restrictions. Id. at 158. Kyrtsis further explains that volatile currencies and
other unstable economic conditions created opportunities for “speculation and arbitrage[,] . . .
undermin[ing] the stable relationships” that had previously characterized reinsurance. Id. at
159.
225 See id. (describing reciprocal reinsurance treaties in the post-war period).
226 See Pearson, The Evolution of the Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 71, 79–80
(highlighting that the First World War’s impact on market forces allowed new reinsurers to
enter the market and meet the demand for reinsurance).
227 See id. at 79–82 (explaining that a purpose of reciprocal reinsurance contracts was to
change the balance of power between the parties); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (setting
out a hostage model of exchange).
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processing, things like that. That’s really a much more
functional analysis of the ceding company by the
reinsurer. It is possible for the ceding company to
misrepresent those aspects of the business. I’ll give you
an example: . . . We suddenly started getting claims
from this company going back to the 1980s. Everyone’s
going through the records and it appears that the
reinsurer paid claims and suddenly stopped paying
claims for decades. Now new management comes into
the ceding company and wants to clean things up. Why
would the reinsurer stop paying claims? The head of our
records department discovered that the ceding company
was cooking the books—changing the dates on claims to
make them look like they were covered.228
Because ex ante due diligence and intensive ongoing monitoring
were expensive, several alternative practices were also employed.
Reinsurers sometimes accepted cessions based on representations
and warranties and audited a ceding company only if there was
reason to suspect a misrepresentation or a change in operating
practices.229 Under this approach, the duty of utmost good faith
228 Interview (Aug. 1 & 2, 2019). This person started working in reinsurance in the 1970s.
Two other subjects, one of whom started in the business in the 1980s and the other in the
1970s, echoed that the reinsurer would study the underwriting and claims handling
operations of a ceding company before writing a treaty. Interview (Aug. 14, 2019); Interview
(Aug. 16, 2019); see also C.E. Golding, Retrocession, in J. INS. INST. MANCHESTER 115 (1927)
(“[T]he habits and customs and general methods of ceding companies are of special interest
to reinsurance men and the most successful practitioners in the business are those who have
studied this phase of the matter to the greatest advantage. In accepting a treaty you are
binding yourself for an extended period and for a great variety of risks and you have to
consider properly the underwriting reputation of your proposed ceding companies. You want
to know whether the executive head of the company is cautious, or otherwise, and whether
his insurance instincts are sound. All these somewhat intangible factors have their due
weight, besides the actual past experience of the treaty and the terms of the contract.”);
THOMPSON & RALPH, supra note 63, at 161 (“Before a ceding company negotiates a treaty, it
will probably desire to make sure that the reinsurance company is in a sound financial
condition. It will consider its subscribed as well as its paid-up capital, and the financial
standing of the shareholders of unpaid stock may be investigated. The capital stock of the
corporation should also be weighed with the amount of the reserves of the company. The
nature of the reserves, as well as their availability to pay immediately heavy losses under the
particular treaty, ought to be considered.”).
229 Interview (Aug. 1 & 2, 2019); see also Kramer, supra note 127, at 11 (“In reinsurance a
person’s word is good, assumed to be given in good faith, and it will be relied upon. In giving
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operated together with an expectation that the reinsurer was
permitted to inspect the books of the ceding company at any time.
The duty of utmost good faith required the cedent to disclose all
information material to the reinsurer’s decision to underwrite the
risk and to refrain from departing in its underwriting and claims
handling processes, after the treaty entered into force, from its
representations to the reinsurer about those processes.230 A
violation of the duty justified rescission of the contract.231
Disclosure and reporting requirements and records access,
combined with the reinsurer’s entitlement to rescind the agreement
at a whiff of concealment or misrepresentation, provided strong
assurance to the reinsurer.232 The reinsured must grant access to its
records upon request.233 Though this express or implied term was
rarely invoked, the threat of it sufficed.234 Reinsurers infrequently
audited the information represented to them by their current ceding
companies, either about risks underwritten or claims paid, unless
they had a reason to suspect misfeasance.235 Reinsurers’
representatives, however, continually traveled throughout the
world to visit current and prospective counterparties and produce
lengthy, detailed travel reports about insurers’ business strategies,
operations, success, and personnel.236
it, the person is necessarily assumed to be authorized to do so and to be sufficiently
knowledgeable and skilled to preclude its groundless disavowal later. Were this not so, the
cost of transacting reinsurance would be significantly increased, and it is doubtful it would
survive as we know it today.”).
230 See Kramer, supra note 127, at 9 (“A basic duty of the reinsured is to disclose to the
reinsurer all known information touching on the risk of loss.”).
231 See id. (explaining that if the cedent fails in the duty to disclose all material information,
“the reinsurance contract may be rescinded or cancelled”).
232 See Salm, supra note 107, at 100 (observing that the obligations between the reinsurer
and reinsured, along with possible cancellation remedies, created an arrangement similar to
a fiduciary relationship, “with all that term implies in the way of confidence and trust”).
233 See id. (explaining that, at a minimum, the ceding company must provide accounting
data to the insurer).
234 See id. (explaining that the “slightest suspicion” of noncompliance from the reinsured
“may very well lead to cancellation of the contract”).
235 See Winfield W. Greene, The Position of the Reinsurance Company in the Casualty
Business, 14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOCIETY 36, 45, 48 (1927) (showing
the lack of audits and suggesting a remedy by means of quarterly audits).
236 See Niels Viggo Haueter & Geoffrey Jones, Risk and Reinsurance, in MANAGING RISK IN
REINSURANCE: FROM CITY FIRES TO GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 72, at 1, 19 (discussing the
vast variety of information collected internationally that focused on strategies, operations,
and staff).
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Additionally, because reinsurers transacted with large numbers
of primary insurers, they could compare different strategies and
operational choices to assess different firms’ reliability and
competence. They could also compare their loss rates across treaties
of the same type among different companies, which would alert
them to whether they had reason to audit a cedent. A pattern of
losses that exceeded premiums would also trigger an audit.237
Like the incentive alignment mechanisms discussed above, the
ability to investigate and monitor counterparties facilitated initial
cooperation and ongoing cooperation with primary insurance firms
with which a reinsurer did not share many or strong network
connections. A reinsurer was more likely to investigate a firm and
its records before concluding a treaty if the reinsurer did not know
the ceding company’s managers and they did not share mutual
connections.238 Intensive monitoring was also more commonly
employed by reinsurers that did not rely on transactional incentive
alignment, such as those underwriting excess-of-loss reinsurance.239
3. Construction and Maintenance of a Small-World Network.
Participants in the reinsurance trade built an intercontinental
network that served as a powerful mechanism of reputational
governance. Though the available evidence does not permit a
mapping of social ties, it suggests that the network was structured
as a small-world network. A small-world network consists of several
densely connected cliques that are more sparsely connected to one
another.240 As explained in more detail below, local insurance
hubs—and in small countries, national insurance markets—had the
properties of dense clique networks. 241 Social ties within them were
widely distributed, and actors within each hub had, in general, more
frequent interactions with one another and were more embedded in
shared social networks that were not solely commercial than they
See Interview (July 31, 2019) (explaining that a pattern of losses is a red flag and
thereby often triggers audits).
238 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 2, 11–12 (discussing “the practice
of negotiating and sustaining treaties through personal relationships,” and providing
examples of reinsurance companies that diverged from this norm).
239 See Kyrtsis, supra note 94, at 171 (detailing the implication of direct involvement in
relationship management).
240 See Joel A.C. Baum, Andrew V. Shipilov & Tim J. Rowley, Where Do Small Worlds Come
From?, 12 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 697, 697 (2003) (explaining how interfirm networks
function similarly to small world networks).
241 See infra Section IV.C.5 (discussing the creation of mass information channels).
237
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were with network members outside of the local hub.242 There were
fewer ties connecting hubs, and these ties had to be intentionally
cultivated in a manner discussed further below.243
As noted in the previous two Sections, investigating prospective
counterparties and closely aligning incentives were most important
for getting initial cooperation started, especially with prospects
unknown to the firm considering transacting and to all members of
its network. The possibility of investigating a prospective
transactional partner lowered the cost of adding new nodes to the
network of firms connected by links between those that have
transacted with one another.
But as network connections proliferated, they allowed traders to
economize on investigation costs by relying on the network for
information.244 A reinsurer was more likely to begin a relationship
with a ceding company with minimal investigation if a shared
connection vouched for the cedent.245 Additionally, some firms
would provide additional reinsurance if another reinsurer whose
underwriting it trusted had underwritten a part of the risk.246
Membership in certain insurance trade associations could also serve
as a trusted indicator of quality that enabled ceding companies to
initiate cooperation with reinsurers with which they did not share
network connections.247
Business practices both strengthened the existing network ties
among current and past trading partners and created new ties. As
traders traveled abroad to gather information about prospective and

242 The valuation of a social network tie is a measure of the intensity or frequency of
interactions between two nodes. See DAVID KNOKE & SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
52–53 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining the social ties within local insurance hubs compared to dense
cliques).
243 See infra Section IV.C.4 (discussing targeted investment in relationships).
244 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 11–12 (discussing how members
of the network worked with one another to obtain information on cedents).
245 See id. at 11 (showing that the trend of reinsurers to spend less time investigating a
ceding company if a mutual connection vouches for the ceding company).
246 See Richard E. Johnson, Reinsurance: Theory, New Applications, and the Future, 44 J.
RISK & INS. 55, 65 (1977) (illustrating how fair pricing should cause insurance companies and
reinsurance companies to have similar profits and losses but noting that excess of loss and
stop loss coverage can unfairly affect these margins via higher premiums).
247 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 12 (describing reinsurers’ use of
reputable organizations, like the Fire Offices Committee, in their investigation of ceding
companies).
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current transactional partners,248 they developed relationships and
trust with their counterparts in insurance firms and other
reinsurance firms.249 For example, one Swiss Re executive was seen
as instrumental in bringing the company back from the brink of ruin
due in part to his social adeptness by “feasting and carousing” with
German fire insurance association members and their spouses.250
Because reinsurance traders could establish close personal ties
with only a limited number of others and gather firsthand
information on only a small proportion of risks underwritten,251 they
gathered information about the quality of foreign insurance firms
largely through their networks.252 Reinsurance and insurance
executives stayed in frequent contact with their strong network ties
by mail, telegram, and telephone “from hotel rooms, railway
stations, and branch offices around the world.”253 Through these
channels, they exchanged information about other reinsurers and
insurers, including by passing along secondhand information about
companies with which they did not have direct relationships.254
4. Targeted Investment in Relationships. A third contract
governance technique was the targeted investment in close personal
relationships with other traders. These investments both
strengthened the force of commitments between the two traders and
built powerful information channels that increased the power of the
network to govern contractual behavior.
The structure of the industry strengthened the threat of bilateral
sanctions by reinsurers against ceding companies that defected. The
loss of relationship with one reinsurer could be costly for an insurer
because there were relatively few reinsurers. A ceding company

See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 261 (discussing the importance of personal
relationships and trust in the industry).
250 Id. at 262.
251 See id. at 56–57 (“Right up until the 1870s, the number of insurance companies
operating overseas—both foreign and national—had remained quite limited. The network of
cross-border links was still very loose and not very stable, and the volume of interactions
across state borders remained small.”).
252 See id. at 78 (providing an example of British reinsurance traders who cooperated with
continental European companies to obtain financial information on foreign firms).
253 Pearson, Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 74.
254 See ROHLAND, supra note 152, at 112–13 (describing reinsurers’ use of these
relationships following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake).
248
249
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would expect that it would likely at in the future want to have access
to a given reinsurer’s underwriting capacity.255
The search costs involved in learning about the capabilities and
character of potential counterparties provided incentives to play
honestly with a high-quality partner with which one had already
established a relationship.256 Bilateral sanctions were reasonably
effective because search costs were high enough to incentivize
playing honestly. Additionally, there was a sufficiently robust
market so that a party who had been cheated would be able to find
alternative counterparties. Search costs were higher for the
reinsurer than for the insurer because there were fewer reinsurers
and the reinsurer’s opportunities for shirking without detection
were more limited than the ceding company’s. The ceding company’s
investment in acquiring knowledge about the reinsurer was focused
on learning information relevant to financial stability that could be
readily provided or discovered through insurance rating agencies257
and trade publications,258 as well as information about how the
reinsurer had dealt with other ceding companies in the past. The
ceding company wanted to know that the reinsurer paid covered
claims timeously and that it was not disposed to disputing coverage
unreasonably.
The reinsurer, on the other hand, needed to transact with a much
larger number of ceding companies with diversified risk portfolios
and to protect itself against moral hazard in the ceding company’s
underwriting and claims handling practices. Acquisition of this
reputational information was costly enough that one’s own good
experience with a particular counterparty was worth preserving;
however, even a significant investment in learning about a

255 Interview (Aug. 14 & 20, 2019); see also Kramer, supra note 127, at 28–29 (describing
how reinsurance affects underwriting capacity).
256 Cf. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant
Marketing, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 30 (1978) (describing how high search costs resulting from
the difficulty of ascertaining the quality of goods in a bazaar economy gives rise to
“clientelization,” or long-term trading relationships with a few partners once trust is
established).
257 See generally Best’s Insurance Reports, AM BEST, https://web.ambest.com/informationservices/sales-information/analytical-products/best's-insurance-reports (last visited Oct. 13,
2022) (providing a prominent credit rating agency’s report on insurance markets and
companies).
258 See, e.g., THE EASTERN UNDERWRITER (2015) (functioning as a prominent twentieth
century insurance trade publication).
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counterparty’s reputation would not give rise to lock-in once
experience falsified those beliefs about trustworthiness.259
Other factors that tend to strengthen bilateral sanctions, though,
were missing. In particular, the investments required for each party
to perform were not inherently relationship specific. The ceding
company’s relevant investments were in the quality of its
underwriting and claims processing operations and in acquiring
customers. The reinsurer’s investments were symmetrical: to
maintain its stability and thus its ability to pay covered losses, a
reinsurer invested in the quality of its underwriting and claims
handling operations and in maintaining a high-quality and
accurately priced risk portfolio. These investments are not specific
to one reinsurance partner.
To strengthen bilateral sanctions as a commitment
mechanism,260 some reinsurance traders pursued a strategy of
targeted intensive relationship cultivation.261 These traders would
develop close personal ties with select counterparties. Reinsurance
executives
travelled
extensively
to
sustain
business
relationships,262 and firms paid for spouses to accompany employees
on travel to develop business.263 While the firms’ agents were
conducting business, their wives would:
[G]o on trips together, spend time together, in the
evenings you’d have dinner with the spouse and the
business associates. You started to know the families.
You’d discuss kids, what’s going on family wise. You got
very, very – my best friends now are people in the
business – because we grew up together, our families
knew each other. . . . Now at a convention, there’s no
spouses. If so, they’re hidden in the room; most
It might be that Party A is more likely to interpret Party B’s actions charitably if her
initial diligence on Party B turned up a spotless reputation. Thus, Party B would be given
more chances to cheat before the relationship is terminated. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text (explaining trust dynamics in markets).
260 See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 29, at 2432 (providing evidence that lock-in
facilitated by bilateral relationships can develop strong commitment between parties).
261 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 2–3 (discussing the strategy of
relationship building).
262 See id. at 2 n.5 (describing how a manager of Munich Re in the early twentieth century
traveled six months of each year).
263 Interview (Aug. 14, 2019 & Aug. 20, 2019).
259
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corporations won’t pay for your spouse anymore. It’s a
dramatic change. Relationships are much less central.
My closest friends in the business are all over the world.
We would meet. Some of my clients I went on vacation
with. The families got so close, we ended up going on
vacation together.264
One broker emphasized the importance of
development to the way business used to be done:

relationship

When it was time to go talk to Lloyd’s about a U.S.
property account, you’d get on a boat and spend a
month. That’s a little different than emailing. It wasn’t
even a transatlantic flight. The situations have changed
so dramatically, it’s hard to compare the old days to the
new days in terms of formation of relationships because
relationships are so much easier to form today because
of the advancement of communications technology.
That probably also contributes to the fact that there’s
less partnership in the transactions because there are
so many alternatives . . . . It was more of a family affair,
get to know spouses, children’s names and birthdays . .
. . A reinsurer would really understand and get to know
the business of their customer before getting involved in
trying to write business for the customer. Now the
reinsurers get so much information in terms of deals
that are available, they couldn’t have enough people to
get into the depth of understanding. Those sorts of close
personal relationships don’t develop; they’re certainly
not as deep or personal. It makes absolute sense to me
that the contract which memorializes the transaction
needs to get more specific because . . . [there’s] less of a
relationship that’s created and more of a trade.265

264 Interview (Aug. 14 & 20, 2019). Historical studies of reinsurance reveal similar habits
of relationship building going back to the early twentieth century. See ROHLAND, supra note
152, at 43 (describing one businessman’s experience of reinsurance directors taking part in
social activities along with their wives).
265 Interview (Aug. 15, 2019).
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The strategy of investment in relationships, as these reinsurance
traders explain, is no longer dominant. It was an equilibrium
strategy when search costs were higher, and it was more difficult to
distinguish high-quality from low-quality insurance portfolios. As
explained above, reinsurance was written primarily in treaty form,
under which the reinsurer would cover a large pool of policies
written by a primary insurer,266 such as all automobile policies
written in a geographic area. Therefore, the determinants of quality
were the primary insurer’s underwriting and claims processing
operations.267 Before the advent of modern computing, which
introduced advanced data analysis and actuarial techniques into
reinsurance, the reinsurer relied heavily on qualitative information
for ascertaining the skill and integrity of an insurance firm.268
Investing in personal relationships therefore served two key
functions, which were also mutually reinforcing, in sustaining
bilateral cooperation. First, it allowed for lower-cost dissemination
of information relevant to quality and improved the accuracy of
interpretation of the other party’s actions.269 Second, the
investments in close personal and family ties were non-salvageable
investments that motivated the production of high quality.270
Reinsurance historically did not lend itself to the kind of large
capital investments in production that occur in manufacturing. But
personal
investment
in
intimate
relationships
with

266 See Kyrtsis, supra note 94, at 148 (describing the prevalence of treaty reinsurance where
primary insurers shared risk with the primary insurer).
267 See id. at 148 n.14 (explaining that the reinsurer was dependent on the fortunes of the
ceding company).
268 See id. at 168–69 (discussing the declining importance of incentive-aligning forms of
reinsurance transaction with the advent of modern computing and risk and modeling).
269 See, e.g., Gilson et. al., Braiding, supra note 43, at 1395–98 (explaining how ongoing
relations improve informal enforcement by improving each party’s ability to classify the other
party’s behavior as breaching or nonbreaching, opportunistic or not, or reciprocating or not).
270 When quality is hard to determine, a supra-competitive price can incentivize the
production of high quality. But in a competitive market, such prices will attract entrants and
drive down the price, giving rise to an equilibrium strategy of producing low quality.
Therefore, the only sustainable form of competition is to dissipate profits through expenditure
on firm-specific capital, such as investments in branding or non-salvageable productive
assets. Non-salvageable asset investment is typically conceived of as capital-intensive
production. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 627–28 (1981) (providing an overview of nonsalvageable productive assets).
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counterparties—which were also productive by improving the
quality of informal contract governance—served the same function.
These selectively cultivated, thick personal ties yielded the
additional payoff of strengthening the effectiveness of the network
as an information channel. Strong interpersonal ties allowed for the
transmission of more trusted and detailed information, including
assessments of the behavior and competencies of other traders
obtained through experience as well as market information helpful
for assessing counterparties’ performance.271 While the number of
strong ties any one trader could maintain was limited, the strong
ties among subsets of traders across distances suggests that the
network might have been a small-world network, which has been
shown to economize on information costs and thereby enable
reputation-based private ordering beyond the limited confines of
dense cliques.272 Moreover, as two parties strengthened the ties
between them, they also reduced the costs to each of forming new
connections with the other’s connections.273 This in turn increased
the density and reach of the network.
As this network expanded and became denser,274 it became an
increasingly powerful reputational governance mechanism that
supported a greater variety of deals. Reinsurers were willing to
engage in higher value treaties, riskier treaties, and treaties with
271 See, e.g., Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 10–13 (describing how one
reinsurance executive considering beginning to do business in Japan learned about the
market from an executive of another reinsurance firm who was a personal contact and was
in turn connected with that contact’s contacts in Japan; describing also the process by which
an executive of a Swiss reinsurance firm considering doing business with an insurer in India
sought advice from several personal contacts about “market conditions, . . . company results,
and the reputations of managers”); id. at 18 (describing how a Swiss company consulted a
close partner in North America before deciding whether to underwrite new business with a
different firm in North America and was warned about the prospect’s poor performance and
“doubts about the capability and honesty of [the prospect’s] managers both at home and in
the US”); id. at 12 (explaining how reinsurers triangulated information from various contacts
to check on ceding companies rather than relying solely on bilateral trust).
272 See Bernstein, Contract Governance, supra note 2, at 1066 (“The ubiquity of small-world
networks I commerce and bond trade outside the shadow of the law . . . suggests . . . the
analysis must move beyond the conditions the legal literature associates with private
ordering—namely, close-knit, geographically concentrated, densely connected cliques.”).
273 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 11–12 (describing how the ability
of a trusted connection to “vouch for” a prospective new partner substituted for investigation
of that prospective partner).
274 Network density is a measure of the portion of the potential connections in a network
that are actual connections. KNOKE & YANG, supra note 242, at 55–56.
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distant insurance firms about which they had limited direct
information or the soundness of which they had limited capacity to
assess themselves. The rise of excess of loss reinsurance, beginning
in the 1920s, is an example of the shift away from strict inventive
alignment.275 As explained above, in quota share reinsurance, the
reinsurer takes a proportional share of premiums and risk and
calibrates the cedent’s retention to reduce moral hazard.276 In excess
of loss reinsurance, the reinsurer agrees to take on all or most of
any losses over a threshold amount.277 Acknowledging that the risk
of moral hazard under these treaties was significantly greater,
reinsurers engaged in more network coordination to more
effectively monitor cedents under excess of loss treaties.278 The
network also reduced transaction costs by reducing the need to
conduct intensive investigation of prospective and current
counterparties and to closely align incentives.279
5. Creation of Mass Information Channels. Part of what enabled
this large, geographically dispersed, heterogeneous market280 to
function was the one-sided concentration among reinsurers that
facilitated long-distance information exchange about the behavior
of ceding companies. That dynamic was strengthened by the fact
that reinsurers often partnered on treaty reinsurance, concluding
deals with one cedent and several reinsurers.281 Reinsurance
underwriting departments were small. As explained by one former
trader:
[T]he number of substantial reinsurers has always been
relatively small, so if the ceding company burns the
275 See Kyrtsis, supra note 94, at 159 (describing the “growing tendency towards ceding
excess of loss” in the 1920s).
276 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 4 (delineating the formulation
behind quota share reinsurance).
277 See Pearson, The Industry Structure, supra note 80, at 82 (discussing the rise and
calculation of excess-loss transactions).
278 See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 152, 178 (examining the organization and problems
surrounding reinsurance and excess of loss treaties).
279 See supra notes 216–229 and accompanying text; Pearson, Normative Practices, supra
note 104, at 2–4 (discussing how reinsurance firms relied on information from their network
connections as a substitute for investigation of prospective cedents and the decline of longterm, face-to-face contact as the network expanded).
280 See supra notes 57–87 and accompanying text.
281 See JAMES ET AL, supra note 65, at 163 (discussing partnership among reinsurers).
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reinsurer and then goes to marketplace, that is known.
It’s a small group of people, and word gets around fast,
. . . it’s hard to walk away and get a good rate from
someone else . . . . If you’re dealing with a hundred or so
people, word gets around fast.282
At Lloyd’s of London, with its broker model, word spread day-byday and even minute-by-minute as market participants working in
close proximity were in nearly constant communication.283 Similar,
if lower velocity, rumor mills were at work among players in
insurance hubs within the United States.284 But across borders,
there were fewer ties and thus less frequent gossip among primary
insurers. Information flow among primary insurers was facilitated
by two key conferences—in Monte Carlo and Baden Baden—which
convened industry participants from the United States and Europe
just before the renewal season, as transactors were preparing to
conclude new contracts and to decide whether to renew old ones.285
These gossip channels were supplemented by the trade press,
which published detailed information about firms and people in the
industry, such as the names of the founders and managers of new
insurance firms or of new executives at firms and colorful reports of
goings-on in insurance companies, reinsurance deals, and
reinsurance men.286 Here, for instance, is an excerpt from one
report:
282 Interview (Aug. 1 & 2, 2019). A second interview subject offered the same estimate: that
around 100 people were making underwriting decisions about United States reinsurance in
the 1960s, when he started working in the industry. See also Interview (July 30, 2019);
Interview (July 31, 2019).
283 Interview (Aug. 9, 12 & 13, 2019).
284 See Interview (Aug. 1 & 2, 2019) (explaining that reinsurers shared information about
cedents “[m]ostly at places which served alcohol . . . . People would have lunch, go out drinking
in the evening, drink together in the bar cars on trains going home in the suburbs. People
would get to know each other through trade associations and things like that. There were few
enough people involved that it’s hard for somebody to go too far off the path before they
become persona non grata.”); Interview (Aug. 16, 2019) (“The people who are mistreated talk
about people who have mistreated them. It spreads like a virus; it’s not planned.”); Interview
(July 30, 2019) (“In New York, it was all done around John Street. In San Francisco, it was
all done in a five-block radius. In London, at and around Lloyds. After work, people would go
to bars and talk.”).
285 See Interview (Aug. 16, 2019); Interview (July 31, 2019); Interview (July 30, 2019).
286 See, e.g., Notes from New England, 4 MKT. WORLD & CHRON. 631 (New York) (1912)
(mentioning insurance firm organization changes and appointments); see also JAMES ET AL.,
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[T]he company became notorious as a payer of excess
commissions . . . Later developments have assisted it in
getting its commissions down to where they should be.
The company did a large business for its surplus, and as
much of it was term business the reserves heaped up
rapidly. A year and a half ago it reinsured its farm
business. Later it reinsured a large amount of its term
business, but still later took it back. George L. Wiley,
for some years secretary in charge of the company, was
not trained in the insurance business. There was some
friction in the office, and last Summer the directors
decided to get a new manager. They negotiated with
Carroll L. DeWitt, who at that time had just resigned as
general agent of the Newark Fire, but did not come to
terms with him. The prospects of the company did not
greatly please him and he placed his figure too high to
suit the directors. Then they secured the services of Joel
W. Hubble, Illinois State agent of the Liverpool and
London and Globe, under a three years’ contract at a
salary said to be $6,000 a year. Mr. Hubble was a very
experienced field man of recognized ability . . . .287
The report continues in this way for some length. It also includes
details of prices at which the companies’ stockholders sought to sell
their stock, the fact that no one would buy the stock, the name of
the former manager and of his current insurance firm, and the
ceding commission reportedly paid by a reinsurer that partnered
with the company.288
Compared to primary insurers, the relative market dominance of
reinsurers and the need for their underwriting capacity by primary
insurers suggests that there might have been limits to the ability of
reputation to constrain them from opportunism. They could, one
supra note 65, at 162, 180 (discussing different insurance industry magazines); 81 NAT’L
UNDERWRITER: LIFE & HEALTH (1977) (exemplifying a typical publication of the time detailing
news in insurance). Other leading trade publications included Best’s Insurance Reports and
The Review.
287 Insurance News in the West, 3 MKT. WORLD & CHRON. 631 (New York) (1912).
288 Id. at 679; see also Interview (July 31, 2019) (discussing the trade press as a source of
information about others’ behavior).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

67

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 [2022], Art. 5

300

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:233

might imagine, behave opportunistically against low-status or
poorly connected insurers, and if they did so infrequently enough
perhaps suffer no reputational harm. But the market was nonanonymous, and the established reputations of individual people
were important. The men who started the first reinsurance
companies had long-established reputations in insurance. The
founder of Munich Re was asked to establish the company by
insurance executives in Munich.289 Senior executives with
established reputations were sent abroad to start foreign offices.290
Network ties among insurers were sustained through trade
associations and “insurance institutes” that created channels
through which they could spread information about reinsurers’
behavior.291 Rather than forming separate reinsurance associations,
reinsurers participated in insurer trade organizations, allowing
them to access primary insurer information networks.292
6. Cultivating Solidarity. Reinsurance traders were
predominantly European, especially in the early years of the
industry, when contracting was most informal. This example,
therefore, undermines the theory that individualistic European
culture cannot support robust reputation-backed trade and that
collectivist culture is necessary to support informal exchange.293
Furthermore, the geographic dispersion of reinsurance traders
would seem to make it more difficult to sustain the norms and
solidarity that have been documented as sustaining exchange
among other groups of traders. For example, Bernstein describes
several key social groups that promoted camaraderie among
Memphis cotton traders, including wives’ clubs, the Memphis
Carnival, secret societies, golf tournaments, and other civic
events.294 In a transnational business in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, nothing like this strong social glue would have
KOPF, supra note 56, at 31.
See id. at 32–33 (discussing Munich Re’s foreign growth).
291 See ROHLAND, supra note 152, at 112–13 (showing that, within some countries, primary
insurance was cartelized for much of the twentieth century; therefore, insurers had strong
cooperative and lobbying organizations).
292 See id. (detailing the meetings which took place between reinsurance directors); cf.
Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 43, at 608–09 (describing Harley
Davidson’s creation of a supplier council to build network ties among its suppliers to allow it
to credibly commit not to misbehave toward any one of them).
293 See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
294 Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 23, at 1750.
289
290
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been possible. In each of the thousands of locations in which ceding
companies were based, the decisionmakers in these companies
would have been participants in social fields unconnected with the
reinsurance companies with which they did business. The social
relationships among reinsurance traders were substantially
different from relationships in the case of geographically
concentrated trading groups within which commercial life is
inseparable from personal social life.
Nonetheless, historical accounts and statements published in the
trade press reveal concerted efforts to promote a sense of common
interest and purpose among insurers and reinsurers to sustain
cooperation.295 The leaders of global reinsurance firms viewed
building trust with other reinsurers and ceding companies as
essential to the sustenance of their industry. In a lecture given at
one of the municipal insurance institutes that dotted the industry
landscapes, an industry leader exhorted listeners that:
Above all we desire a frank recognition that reinsurance is a necessity; that without it insurance
business in its present form could not possibly continue.
So we have the two branches, insurance and reinsurance, working in unity and concord, neither
rivalling, but each supporting and assisting the other,
and presenting to the world at large a vision of
solidarity and strength which shall confer honor and
dignity on the profession to which we are all proud to
belong.296
In keeping with this ethos, payments made as goodwill gestures
were not uncommon and were often motivated by a cedent deemed
to be a trustworthy and competent counterparty that found itself
facing a loss it could not bear that was not caused by poor business
practices.297
See Pearson, Birth Pains, supra note 73, at 46–47 (providing examples of national and
international cooperation among reinsurers).
296 British Re-Insurance Conditions Reviewed, THE EASTERN UNDERWRITER, Jan. 27, 1922,
at 16.
297 See Interview (Sept. 13, 2019) (“I did a cat cover in 2001, and the broker was from
London and put in a terrorism exclusion. We had signed the deal ahead of 9/11, and they
excluded terrorism because in London they had more experience with it at that time. We paid
295
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The case of reinsurance suggests that when parties have clear
shared long-term interests in forming potential mutual benefits
through cooperation, the trust needed to support exchange can be
cultivated rather than being highly contingent on initial cultural
conditions. This conclusion comports with theoretical and empirical
findings on the emergence of cooperation. Acting as if one trusts
another person by initiating cooperation might itself produce
reciprocal cooperation by other cooperative types, incentivizing
trusting behavior analogously to the way the promise of financial
return incentivizes speculative investing.298 If the shadow of the
future is sufficiently large, it can jumpstart cooperation as parties
engage in trial and error and imitation to discover and spread
cooperative strategies.299 Participants learn from repeated
anyway, because we decided that the broker had included it by mistake, and we had priced it
as including terrorism. I was aware it was excluded but hadn’t really thought about it. It
wasn’t a particularly valuable client. We did it just because we thought it was the right thing,
and they continued to buy reinsurance from us, and we raised the price the next year.”);
Interview (Sept. 18, 2019) (saying that ex gratia payments occurred often); Interview (Aug.
14 & 20, 2019) (“A company had a long relationship with the reinsurers, and during that time
everybody thought this was a reasonable partner. There were wildfires. The contract was
vague, so the company could have gone bankrupt, so we interpreted the contract to have two
losses in the same occurrence. The town that got wiped out in California, we basically cut the
geographical region in half and made it two occurrences so it didn’t go through the company’s
cat[astrophe] covers. The contract itself was liberal or vague, and we interpreted it one way,
and the reinsurers objected. But they eventually paid because otherwise the cedent would
have gone bankrupt. They want to have a future with this company and earn their money
back. Rates are double going forward. This particular company has been in business over 100
years and all these years has been paying premiums.”).
298 See Margaret Levi, The Transformation of a Skeptic: What Nonexperimentalists Can
Learn from Experimentalists, in TRUST & RECIPROCITY 373, 377–378 (Elinor Ostrom & James
Walker eds., 2003) (observing that one needs a good reason to presume the trustworthiness
of another); Kevin A. McCabe & Vernon L. Smith, Strategic Analysis in Games, in TRUST &
RECIPROCITY 275, supra note 298, at 296 (explaining how the concept of reciprocity adds a
useful dimension to traditional game-theory principles); James Walker & Elinor Ostrom,
Conclusion, in TRUST & RECIPROCITY supra note 298, at 381, 382 (defining trust as “the
willingness to take some risk in relation to other individuals on the expectation that the
others will reciprocate”); HARDIN, supra note 31, at 20 (discussing how trust facilitates
cooperation in games that would otherwise not go forward); Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 495, 498–99 (2001) (explaining how early cooperation is key to establishing long-term
cooperative relationships); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 43 (James E. Alt &
Douglass C. North eds., 1990) (positing that cooperation stems from signals that show
willingness to pursue a mutually productive relationship).
299 See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 4 (1984) (“For cooperation to
prove stable, the future must have a sufficiently large shadow. This means that the
importance of the next encounter between the same two individuals must be great enough to
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interaction which others will reciprocate and develop strategies to
distinguish and protect the trading group from untrustworthy
interlopers.300 Cooperation experiments demonstrate that once
established, patterns of cooperation that render benefits spread.301
The reinsurance industry, as a real-world example of this
phenomenon, suggests that it can function even across distances
and within a heterogeneous, loosely knit group.

V. CHANGE IN REINSURANCE AND THE CONTINGENCY OF
INSTITUTIONS
The changes that have occurred in reinsurance transactions
since the 1970s—longer contracts, shopping annually rather than
remaining loyal to the same reinsurers for years, a higher incident
of third-party adjudication, and the move toward more formalized
arbitration302—suggest that the industry now structures its
transactions more formally than in the past, but it is not clear to
what extent traders have shifted to a more formal variety of
extralegal private ordering and to what extent they are engaging in
conventional judicially backed contracting. The opinions of industry
commentators disagree on the point.303 Theoretically, the increasing
length of contracts does not necessarily imply reduced trust or
greater reliance on formal legal institutions. It could instead result
from parties recording in their agreements what they have learned
over time through experience.304 Incorporating such learning into
the contract can save time when similar problems recur. Some
attribute the demise of long-term relationship-based contracting to
the late rise of brokers, which might suggest a turn not to public
make defection an unprofitable strategy. It requires that the players have a large enough
chance of meeting again and that they do not discount the significance of their next meeting
too greatly.”).
300 See id. at 5 (describing how individuals in an established population use discriminating
strategies to increase cooperation).
301 See id. (describing the spread of cooperative patterns between institutions that share
norms).
302 See supra Section III.A.2.
303 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 2 (describing differing opinions
between legal commentators).
304 See Mayer & Argyres, supra note 13, at 404 (finding lengthening contracts in personal
computer manufacturers and their suppliers over time driven by the firms learning how to
work together).
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ordering but to a different, intermediated form of reputation-based
governance.305
If, indeed, transactors have adopted formal, judicially backed
contracting, three initial hypotheses to explain such a shift are (1)
improvement in the availability or suitability of legal institutions to
traders, (2) disintegration of the private structures that supported
trade, and (3) government regulation requiring more formal
contracts.
Improvement in the relative suitability of legal institutions
might have been driven by changes in the features of the trade, such
as improved actuarial techniques for pricing risk (a move along the
continuum from uncertainty to risk), reduced reliance on expert
judgment, and the possibility of securitizing risk. Each of these
developments might have made reinsurance transactions more
contractible by making obligations easier to specify by reference to
quantitative metrics.306 However, for such improvements in legal or
contracting technologies to have caused a movement to formal
dispute resolution (at least as a credible threat), reinsurance
traders would need to have become less concerned about the
confidentiality of their records and transactions because the secrecy
interest was a key reason parties avoided courts.307
Several exogenous shocks might have undermined the
reinsurance network. First, the upheaval of the insurance industry
as a whole by mass toxic tort litigation beginning in the 1960s forced
many insurance and reinsurance companies out of business.308 That
directly and rapidly undermined network ties and also gave rise to
the specter of other companies no longer having a future that might
discipline their behavior in the present.309 The period might be
thought of as casting the entire industry into an end-game state,
undermining the conditions necessary to sustain private

305 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 2 (highlighting the effect of brokers
on corporate relations).
306 See id. (discussing the role of technology in reducing the importance of relationships);
Holland, supra note 87, at 25 (discussing improved actuarial methods improving pricing
accuracy).
307 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
308 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Long-Tail Liability Revolution: Creating the New World
of Tort and Insurance Law, 6 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 347, 355–56, 387–88 (2021) (describing
the insurance crisis that followed the rise of toxic tort ligitgation).
309 See id. (explaining the effects of toxic tort litigation on the insurance industry).
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ordering.310 Additionally, changes to the finance industry increased
market pressure on insurance executives to show high quarterly
earnings and made it more difficult for them to justify declining to
shop each year for the most competitive rates for reinsurance, thus
undermining expectations of long-term relationships.311 These
changes also introduced competition from other risk-mitigating
financial products such as catastrophe bonds.312 Unprecedented
high interest rates in the 1970s made it possible for insurers to earn
significant profits by investing premium income even if their
underwriting results were poor. This undermined the incentives to
invest in long-term relationships and reputational information and
increased entry and competition, weakening the network.313
Finally, government regulators have by turns encouraged and
required more formal reinsurance contracts. In 1994, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, a body of United States
state insurance regulators, amended its accounting practices
guidelines to declare that a reinsurance contract had to be finalized
and recorded in writing within nine months or it must be accounted
for as a retroactive financial transaction.314 The consequence of this
rule was that if a reinsurance contract was not recorded within the
The first decade after these exogenous shocks began saw two high-profile cases of
reinsurance fraud. In 1973, a primary insurer created fake direct policies and ceded them to
reinsurers to collect benefits. Holland, supra note 87, at 25 (citing SOBLE & DALLOS, supra
note 203, at 18–19). Also in the 1970s, the reinsurance broker Pritchard and Baird went
bankrupt as a result of financial malfeasance that included appropriating $8 million held in
trust for its clients. Alfonso A. Alvarez, 2 Brothers Are Indicted in Theft of $8 Million in
Insurance Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 1977), https://www.nytimes.com/1977/03/11/archives/2brothers-are-indicted-in-theft-of-8-million-in-insurance-fees.html. The scandal resulted in
the case Francis v. United Jersey Bank, a standard of corporations casebooks. See generally
Reinier Kraakman & Jay Kesten, The Story of Francis v. United Jersey Bank: When a Good
Story Makes Bad Law, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 163 (J. Mark Ramseyer, ed., 2009)
(describing the legacy of Francis v. United Jersey Bank).
311 See Pearson, Normative Practices, supra note 104, at 12 (describing the increasing
external factors putting pressure on durable relations between insurers and reinsurers).
312 See id. at 2 (describing the effect of the new catastrophe bond market).
313 See Fedor Nierhaus, A 25 Years (and More) in Reinsurance: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 23 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.: ISSUES & PRAC. 318, 319 (1998) (describing the
effect of high interest rates on insurer conduct); cf. Barak D. Richman, An Autopsy of
Cooperation: Diamond Dealers and the Limits of Trust-Based Exchange, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
247, 247 (2017) (showing that increased market competition undermined trust-based
exchange in the diamond industry).
314 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL,
SSAP No. 62, ¶ 23 (1999).
310
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specified time period, the “reinsurance could not be used to reduce
a ceding company’s loss reserves,”315 which measure an insurer’s
liability for future claims. A reduction in loss reserves represents an
apparent increase in the insurer’s risk level. The September 11
World Trade Center insurance disputes provoked regulatory action
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Bermuda to require
contractual certainty; that is, the execution of highly specified,
formal, written documents before reinsurance contracts would be
effective.316
As institutional change in reinsurance suggests, the ability of
business networks to sustain trade, or the desirability to traders of
relying on them rather than other bonding mechanisms, is
contingent. Future work will build on the preliminary observations
made above to better understand whether reinsurance traders have
in fact moved toward more legal contracting beginning around 1980
or to a more formal type of extralegal ordering.317
Parties create and maintain this kind of network when formal or
state-backed enforcement of obligations is unavailable or
exceedingly costly. That condition might arise because of high
verification costs, including from limited judicial competence in the
subject of trade; limits to judicial enforcement power, such as from
geographic dispersion or legal and other evidentiary constraints
that prevent courts from awarding fully compensable damages; or
parties’ interest in keeping sensitive business information or
information about their disputes confidential. The parties must be
able to develop effective alternative means of bonding obligations at
a cost lower than the gains from trade, lower than the cost of statebacked enforcement, and lower than technologically enabled
reputation verification. The account that attributes the breakdown
of informal governance in reinsurance to exogenous shocks suggests
that some minimum level of stability or maximum degree of
volatility might be a precondition to sustaining network-based
governance.318 Much of the first century of reinsurance was a period

BÄHR & KOPPER, supra note 115, at 5.
Id.
317 Discussions of the erosion of traditional forms of extralegal ordering begin to appear in
the literature in the 1970s. See, e.g., Richard E. Johnson, Reinsurance: Theory, the New
Applications, and the Future, 44 J. RISK & INS. 55, 57 (1977) (“[M]utual obligations, time and
changing ethics have eroded the [historic conception of reinsurance].”).
318 See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
315
316
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of confidence that the demand for reinsurance would continue to
grow because of the continued growth in industrialization and
economic modernization.319 Expected gains from future trade would
therefore have been high.

VI. CONCLUSION
The lessons to be learned from reinsurance strike at the heart of
one of the most practically relevant questions in contract theory
today: how to sustain complex collaborations to create valuable
things when courts cannot back the promises that must be made for
these collaborations to work.320 The reinsurance industry suggests
one possible answer: intentionally cultivated trading networks.
Where formal, judicially backed contracting is not feasible for the
trade or is unavailable, the social network required to support
credible commitments need not be as tightly or organically
interconnected as conventionally understood. Instead, parties can
cultivate the trust needed to support trade by starting with
transactions that align incentives and commit to high transparency
about behavior. From there, parties can strengthen their
commitments by making targeted investments in relationships and
by building a network in which each party is connected to multiple
other parties, which allows two kinds of information to spread that
makes reputation more effective: information about behaviors in
each trading relationship and information that improves the
capacity to judge a counterparty’s performance.
In the reinsurance industry, the conditions that give rise to
extralegal, network-based governance were present in a way that
makes them easily identifiable.321 However, these conditions
pervade economic cooperation. Many transactions involve
See JAMES ET AL., supra note 65, at 164–65 (“At the end of the nineteenth century, it
was generally accepted that reinsurance was a necessity for the development of industrial,
growth-driven economies and that it could set the tone for key issues involved in organizing
the insurance industry.”).
320 See, e.g., Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, supra note 13, at 284–
90 (discussing the central role of interfirm collaboration in innovation and the recent contract
theory literature addressing the difficulties of such collaboration); Gilson et al., Contracting
for Innovation, supra note 5, at 479 n.123 (discussing the vertical disintegration of the supply
chain in many industries and the rise of “contracting for innovation,” which braids explicit
and implicit contracting).
321 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
319
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important exchange dimensions that are beyond the reach of
judicial enforcement. For example, litigation is expensive, timeconsuming, and reputationally costly; parties have business secrets
they are not willing to expose by suing; many generalist courts have
limited competence in complex matters relating to commerce and
innovation; and damages for breach of contract systematically
undercompensate. These constraints place a broad range of desired
terms of trade beyond the reach of judicially backed contracting.
The complexity of trade that poses challenges to generalist courts
attempting to resolve reinsurance disputes is found commonly in
modern commerce, from types of transactions that are sometimes
thought of as simple, such as sales of goods governed by Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, to complex interfirm collaborations
to produce new technology.322 The experience of reinsurance
demonstrates some limits of employing contextualist interpretation
of contracts among sophisticated parties to better reflect business
practices.323 The key insight is that for contextualist adjudication to
be effective and trusted, the adjudicator must be capable of and

322 Even in sales of goods, the vertical disintegration of production has resulted in supply
relationships that call for customized inputs produced by collaboration between seller and
buyer that bear little resemblance to the trade of finished, standardized goods presupposed
by the drafters of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Second Restatement of
Contracts. Complexity makes it costly to verify to a court the facts relevant to whether breach
occurred and what the proper remedies are. In addition, there are legal limits on remedies—
such as the rule against penalty clauses and the difficulty of getting specific performance—
that pose barriers to courts’ ability to efficiently resolve these disputes. Collaborative
framework agreements pose even more challenges for current law because there is no
quantifiable expected value of an agreement that requires each side to invest in research and
design efforts toward a currently undefined end product. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 1610, 1624 (2008) (discussing the application of awarding market damages and noting
courts’ general tendency to enact mandatory rules that displace standard commercial
practice).
323 See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also Kadens, supra note 33, at 1205–06
(noting the flaws in the story of the law merchant and arguing that contract and statute,
rather than custom, gave rise to the most widespread aspects of commercial law); Lisa
Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A
Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 712–13 (1999) (discussing to what extent industrywide commercial standards incorporated into commercial agreements actually exist in
merchant communities); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 908 n.231 (1992) (discussing a consent theory of
contract and showing how the concept of default rules bolsters the theoretical importance of
consent).
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perceived to be capable of determining and understanding the
relevant context. The reinsurance trade has resorted to very
contextualist, even equitable adjudication, but traders were and
remain emphatic that generalist courts lack competence to decide
their disputes.324
Whatever the reasons that judicial enforcement is unsuitable, a
network will be built only when the cost of building it is no greater
than the value of gains from trade, the cost of state-backed
enforcement, or the cost of other bonding mechanisms such as
technologically enabled reputation verification. Network-based
governance might also require a minimum level of market stability
so that players are not excessively concerned about other traders
entering an end-game state that undermines the expected value of
future trade.325
Finally, this study has implications for the lawyer’s role. Lawyers
can create value for their clients by designing agreements that
make disputes less likely and easier to resolve. One way to do so is
to appreciate the limits of what courts can do and the possibility of
leveraging other governance mechanisms available to the parties,
including participation in or even the creation of networks of firms.

In the 1990s, while the surge of asbestos and environmental tort litigation in insurance
was reverberating in the reinsurance trade, industry participants seriously considered
turning from arbitration to litigation. Interview (Nov. 21, 2019). They were concerned that
the large amounts at stake were no longer suitable for a form of adjudication that lacked full
rights of appeal and did not produce precedent or even published reasoning. Id. However, the
record of generalist courts in interpreting reinsurance contracts was so poor in the eyes of
reinsurance industry participants that parties decided to continue with arbitration in spite
of its drawbacks. Id. In fact, the use of arbitration in the reinsurance industry expanded into
facultative reinsurance contracts during this time. Id. Historically, disputes concerning
facultative contracts had been litigated, but a decision by the Southern District of New York,
which was affirmed by the Second Circuit, was widely viewed as egregiously misinterpreting
a facultative contract and drove facultative contract parties to arbitration. Bellefonte Reins.
Co. et al. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990) (“We reject Aetna’s contentions
that the ‘follow the fortunes’ doctrine, or the ‘in addition thereto’ language in each reinsurance
certificate, exempts defense costs from the clauses limiting liability . . . . We hold that these
costs are ‘subject to’ the express cap on liability set forth in each certificate.”), abrogated by
Global Reins. Corp. of Am. v. Century Indem. Co., 22 F.4th 83 (2d Cir. 2021); see also
Interview (Nov. 21, 2019).
325 See supra Part IV.
324
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY
I conducted semi-structured interviews with seventeen
professionals with long-term experience in the reinsurance
industry. In qualitative studies designed to “understand common
processes, shared experiences and understandings, or to identify
shared cultural knowledge and norms,” six to twelve interviews
usually suffice to reach “saturation,” the point at which most
relevant themes are identified.326 The average interview length was
one hour thirty-six minutes; interviews ranged from thirty minutes
to interviews comprising several conversations lasting more than
three hours total. Interviewees were promised anonymity to
encourage forthrightness.
I used a supplemented snowball sampling method.327 The
industry shifted substantially toward formality around 1980, so I
sought to interview people who began working in reinsurance as
long ago as possible and at least before 1980. The first attempt was
to contact the editor and all authors of relevant chapters in the first
reinsurance textbook, published in 1980.328 The chapters were
authored by leaders in the field who were experts on their respective
topics. A search for contact information for that initial list of twentyfour people returned eleven obituaries. No information could be
located on most of the remaining people, and calls to phone numbers
matching other names were not returned or revealed that the
person reached was not the person sought. I reached only one person
from this group of twenty-four.
I had more success by contacting the Reinsurance Association of
America. The President of that organization put me in contact with

326 GREG GUEST, EMILY E. NAMEY & MARILYN L. MITCHELL, COLLECTING QUALITATIVE
DATA: A FIELD MANUAL FOR APPLIED RESEARCH 48 (2013).
327 In snowball sampling, earlier interview subjects recommend others for future interviews
who have the characteristics of interest for the research. JOHN LOFLAND, DAVID A. SNOW,
LEON ANDERSON & LYN H. LOFLAND, ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE
OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 43 (2006). I combined snowball sampling with targeted searches
for professionals having experience in relevant roles and during the period of interest. The
sample is not random or statistically representative. Purposeful sampling is appropriate for
selecting people who know about the phenomenon of interest, especially where that
phenomenon plays out among a small, specialized social group. See generally JOHN W.
CRESWELL & VICKI L. PLANO CLARK, DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING MIXED METHOD
RESEARCH (2011) (providing examples and methodologies for mixed method research).
328 REINSURANCE (Robert W. Strain ed., 1980).
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prominent industry participants who began working in reinsurance
during the period of interest. Those people put me in touch with
others. Targeted searches produced many more obituaries, but I
supplemented the snowball sampling by directly contacting people
who have written or appeared in trade literature or whom I found
through LinkedIn.
Ultimately, I was able to interview ten people who began working
in reinsurance before 1980. One of them began in the 1950s, several
in the 1960s, and several in the 1970s. The other seven
interviewees, who began their careers after 1980, had a markedly
different perspective on reinsurance contracting but were able to
offer insights into how and why the industry changed and were also
valuable sources of contacts with other industry participants.
Interview subjects were all current or former chief executive
officers or other senior executives of either reinsurance firms or
reinsurance brokers, or they were law firm partners who specialize
in reinsurance. Five had worked only for brokerage firms, eight had
worked for reinsurance firms, three had always worked at law
firms, and one had been an in-house lawyer and a law firm lawyer.
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